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FROM THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO THE POORHOUSE:
THE CREDIT CARD ACT’S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY
PROTECT YOUNG CONSUMERS
EBONI S. NELSON*
I. INTRODUCTION

A

S commonly recognized in our society, higher education often serves
as a gateway of opportunity for many young adults.1 Obtaining a college or professional degree provides not only an essential prerequisite for
securing certain types of employment,2 but also facilitates access to the
leadership and democratic institutions that shape our society.3 Unfortu* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.
J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Wake Forest University. My thanks to Steve
Bender, Josh Eagle, Michele Goodwin, Danielle Holley-Walker, Susan Kuo, Robert
Lawless, Katherine Porter, Peggie Smith, and Elizabeth Warren for comments,
suggestions, and discussion on this Article. Also, my thanks to workshop
participants at the University of Iowa College of Law Faculty Summer Writing
Workshop for helpful discussion of some of the issues in this Article. I would also
like to thank Karama Bailey, Vanessa Byars, Pamela Melton, Julie Noland, Jessica
Moore Fisher, Christina Jay, Kayli Maxwell, and Stephanie Marshall for their
invaluable research assistance. Most importantly, I thank Scott and Ella Nelson for
their love, patience, and support.
1. See JOHN IMMERWAHR ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y AND HIGHER EDUC.,
SQUEEZE PLAY: HOW PARENTS AND THE PUBLIC LOOK AT HIGHER EDUCATION TODAY 8
(2007), available at http://www.highereducation.org/reports/squeeze_play/
squeeze_play.pdf (reporting prevalent belief that higher education is necessary for
professional and personal success); Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts:
Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 128 & n.63
(2003) (detailing positive economic benefits of obtaining college degree); Jennifer
Elrod, Article, Academics, Public Employee Speech, and the Public University, 22 BUFF.
PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 12 (2004) (referencing public’s view of higher education as means
to obtain “greater social status and higher paying positions”).
2. See Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 176635 (“A university degree opens the doors to the finest jobs and top professional schools, and
a professional degree, in turn, makes it possible to practice law, medicine, and
other professions.”).
3. See Lani Guinier, Reframing the Affirmative Action Debate, 86 KY. L.J. 505, 516
(1998) (noting that “higher education has become a gateway to democratic citizenship: It is difficult to get a secure job without a college degree, and without a

(1)

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\56-1\VLR101.txt

2

unknown

Seq: 2

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

15-AUG-11

12:33

[Vol. 56: p. 1

nately, the doors of opportunity can be closed to many young adults due
to the substantial amounts of credit card debt they amass during their college careers. Whether it be their inability to qualify for additional student
loans or to pass an employer credit check,4 the educational, financial, and
personal prospects of debt-laden students can be severely hindered by the
quagmire of credit card debt in which many find themselves.
In recent years, credit card usage by college students has hit an all
time high.5 On college campuses throughout the country, young and financially inexperienced students are applying for and receiving credit
cards at astonishing rates.6 Colleges and universities are partnering with
credit card companies to receive financial compensation for allowing companies on campus to solicit and market to this group of consumers.7
While it may appear that the majority of student cardholders are managing their debt in a responsible manner,8 a more thorough examination of
the realities that characterize the management or, rather, mismanagement

job, you are not treated as a contributing member of this society”); Susan Sturm,
The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 247, 333 (2006) (“Courts, policymakers, and advocates recognize
higher education as the gateway to citizenship, leadership, and democratic
participation.”).
4. For a discussion of these and other negative consequences associated with
student credit card debt, see infra notes 120-54 and accompanying text.
5. See SALLIE MAE, HOW UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS USE CREDIT CARDS: SALLIE
MAE’S NATIONAL STUDY OF USAGE RATES AND TRENDS 5 (2009) [hereinafter SALLIE
MAE STUDY], available at http://inpathways.net/SLMCreditCardUsageStudy41309
FINAL2.pdf (reporting that college students’ average credit card debt increased
from $1,879 in 1998 to $3,173 in 2008).
6. Id. (reporting that from 1998 to 2008, percentage of undergraduate college students with credit cards increased from sixty-seven percent to eighty-four
percent).
7. See Shea Connelly, Banks Partner with Colleges to Market Use of Credit Cards,
THE CAVALIER DAILY, Jan. 15, 2009, available at http://www.cavalierdaily.com/
news/2009/jan/15/banks-partner-with-colleges-to-market-use-of-credi/ (discussing relationship between University of Virginia and Chase Bank); Jonathan D.
Glater, Colleges Profit as Banks Market Credit Cards to Students, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2009, at B1 (reporting that Bank of America, one of country’s largest card issuers
on college campuses, has “agreements with about 700 colleges and alumni
associations”).
8. See, e.g., Michael E. Staten & John M. Barron, Usage of Credit Cards Received
Through College Student-Marketing Programs, 34 NASFAA J. STUDENT FIN. AID 1, 7, 1314 (2004) (reporting that student cardholders are more likely to pay their balance
in full in any given month and less likely to use their cards for cash advances as
compared to non-student cardholders); Michael McNamara, Conventional Wisdom
on Student Debt Inaccurate, AM. BANKER, Jan. 27, 2003, at 5 (reporting findings from
student credit card study and concluding “that the overwhelming majority of college students are responsible users of credit cards”). In 2008, “only 7 percent [of
college students] admit[ted] to paying less than the minimum required some of
the time when their credit card bill comes due.” SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5,
at 14.
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3

of student credit card debt reveals that numerous students experience difficulty managing their rising levels of credit card indebtedness.9
Students’ increased credit card usage is symptomatic of our society’s
escalating dependence on credit cards.10 In 2006, 173 million cardholders amassed $886 billion in outstanding credit card debt.11 These numbers represent a fourteen million person increase in the number of
cardholders since 2000 and a $206 billion increase in the amount of outstanding debt since that time.12 From 2005 to 2008, the amount of total
outstanding revolving debt, which is primarily comprised of credit card
debt,13 increased from $829.6 billion to $957.5 billion.14
Since 2008, however, the amount of outstanding credit card debt has
steadily declined as consumers have reacted to the current economic recession by paying down their balances, refraining from borrowing on their
cards, and using debit cards more frequently than credit cards.15 The decline may also be due to a decrease in the availability of credit during the
financial crisis. Over the past two years, many lenders have reduced consumers’ credit limits and closed inactive accounts in efforts to reduce their
9. See id. (“[O]nly 17 percent of college students say they regularly pay off all
cards each month . . . . Thus, while they are making at least the required payments
each month, more than three-quarters of college students are incurring finance
charges by carrying over credit card debt month to month.”). For a discussion of
how college students mismanage their credit card debt, see infra notes 92-119 and
accompanying text.
10. See ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION 2, 12–13 (2000) [hereinafter MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION] (providing detailed discussion of “the ascendance of the consumer credit society”); see also TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH
WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN
DEBT 108-40 (2000) [hereinafter SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS] (discussing development and growth of credit society and its financial impact on middleclass consumers).
11. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2009:
BANKING FINANCE, AND INSURANCE 724 tbl.1148 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/09statab/banking.pdf.
12. Id.
13. Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26
YALE J. REG. 143, 191 & n.249 (2009) (“The majority of revolving debt is credit card
debt.”).
14. FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, BOARD OF GOVERNORS, STATISTICAL RELEASE
G.19: CONSUMER CREDIT 1 (2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/20101007/.
15. See id. (reporting that as of August 2010, amount of outstanding revolving
debt was $822.4 billion, which is lower than that outstanding in 2005); see also Sandra Block, Credit Card Use Plunges as Hard Times Drag On, Debit Use Rises, USA TODAY,
Sept. 10, 2010 [hereinafter Block, Credit Card Use Plunges], http://www.usatoday.
com/money/perfi/credit/2010-09-10-credit10_ST_N.htm (reporting survey findings that “56% of consumers used credit cards in 2009, down from 87% in 2007”
and noting that “[i]n 2009, payment volume for debit cards exceeded credit cards
for the first time, a trend that’s expected to continue in 2010”); Ronald J. Mann,
The Good, the Bad and the Doubtful in Credit Card Reform, LOMBARD STREET (June 22,
2009), http://www.finreg21.com/lombard-street/the-good-bad-and-doubtfulcredit-card-reform [hereinafter Mann, Credit Card Reform] (noting that many cardholders paid down their balances in response to economic downturn).
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risk.16 While some are doubtful that consumers’ newfound “frugality” will
continue once the economy rebounds, there are some indications that
consumers’ tempered use of credit cards will continue post-recovery.17
As consumers’ credit card borrowing increased, the credit card industry sought to take advantage of this increased usage by implementing policies and procedures that, while profitable to the companies, have proven
costly and detrimental to consumers. From the imposition of exorbitant
late and over-the-limit fees18 to the practice of universal default,19 the industry has made it very difficult, and in some cases impossible, for cashstrapped consumers to end the cycle of debt in which many find themselves. These and other unfair and deceptive practices prompted Congress to pass the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure
Act of 2009 (the Credit CARD Act or the Act).20
In passing the Credit CARD Act, Congress prohibited the practice of
universal default on outstanding balances21 and established consumer
“opt in” procedures that must be followed before a creditor can assess
over-the-limit fees for extensions of credit that exceed consumers’ credit
16. See Shelly Banjo, Credit Card Companies Slash Credit Limits, WALL ST. J., Jan.
5, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123117246022354083.html
(“[C]redit card companies are slashing consumer credit lines and closing inactive
cards.”); see also Block, Credit Card Use Plunges, supra note 15; Nancy Trejos, Less
Power to Purchase: Consumers’ Credit Limits Slashed as Companies Try to Reduce Risk,
WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2008/11/15/AR2008111500216.html (noting that credit card
companies “are taking a wide range of steps to mitigate their risk”).
17. See Allie Johnson, Frugality: Just a Fad? Or Will Consumers Keep Saving PostRecession?, CREDITCARDS.COM (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.creditcards.com/creditcard-news/frugality-fad-consumer-saving-spend-recession-behavior-1264.php.
18. Industry consultants estimate that in 2009 credit card issuers will have
generated over $20 billion from late fees and over-the-limit penalties. See Andrew
Martin, Credit Card Industry Aims to Profit from Sterling Payers, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
2009, at A1. This amount represents an approximate $5 billion increase in the
amount collected by credit card companies in 2004. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin,
Are Credit Card Late Fees Unconstitutional?, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 457, 460 n.12
(2006); see also MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 94; Ronald J.
Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
375, 389 (2007) [hereinafter Mann, Sweat Box]; Kathleen Day & Caroline E. Mayer,
Credit Card Penalties, Fees Bury Debtors, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at A01.
19. Universal default permits credit card companies to raise a cardholder’s
interest rate if the cardholder defaults on any credit obligation, including those
owed to creditors other than the credit card issuer. Usually without warning or
prior notification, a credit card company can increase a cardholder’s interest rate
if the cardholder is late paying his mortgage, another credit card bill, or even a
utility bill. Events other than late payments, such as exceeding one’s credit limit
on any card, having too much available credit, or obtaining a new mortgage or car
loan, can also trigger universal default interest rate increases. See Ben Woolsey,
Universal Default: What It Is, and How to Avoid It, CREDITCARDS.COM (May 1, 2006),
http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/universal-default-could-raise-yourinterest-rates-1270.php.
20. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
21. Id. § 101(b).
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limits.22 Congress’s enactment of these and other consumer-friendly provisions of the Act should be and have been applauded.23 For decades,
consumer advocates have been urging Congress to take action against the
credit card industry to end unfair practices and to improve consumer disclosures,24 both of which the Credit CARD Act purports to do.25 Congress’s good deed, however, is not immune to criticism,26 especially as it
22. Id. § 102(a). The Credit CARD Act also mandates that over-the-limit
charges as well as other penalties, such as late payment fees, “be reasonable and
proportional to [the] omission or violation” that precipitated the imposition of the
fee. See id. § 102(b).
23. See, e.g., Sandra Block, Fed Rules to Cap Late Fees on Credit Cards, Ban Inactivity Fees, USA TODAY, June 18, 2010 [hereinafter Block, Fed Rules], http://www.
usatoday.com/money/perfi/credit/2010-06-15-fed-credit-card-rules_N.htm
(“Taken together, the new rules will provide consumers with numerous tools for
better management of their credit costs.”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Phyllis Furman & Michael Mcauliff, Consumer Advocacy Groups Praise Credit Card Reform Bill, but Warn It Offers Only Partial Protection, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 21, 2009,
available at http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2009/05/21/2009-05-21_consumer_advocacy_groups_praise_credit_card_reform_bill_but_warn_it_offers_only
_.html (describing Credit CARD Act as “probably the strongest piece of consumer
legislation to pass Congress in a decade”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ben
O’Brien, Our View on Consumer Protection: Beyond Credit Reform, USA TODAY, May 27,
2009, http://content.usatoday.com/topics/post/USA+TODAY+editorial/67302
959.blog/1 (praising legislation as “big victory” for consumers).
24. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 1 (2008); Adam J. Levitin & Todd Zywicki, Modernizing Consumer Protection
in the Financial Regulatory System: Strengthening Credit Card Protections, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., March 2009, at 10, 10; John Dugan, We Support Strict Safeguards, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 2008, at A12; Elizabeth Warren, Consumer Protection As Systemic Safety: If
We Safeguard Consumers, We Also Save the Entire Financial System from Its Own Excesses,
THE AM. PROSPECT, June 2010, at A6; Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer: The
Case for Regulation, HARV. MAG., May-June 2008, at 34–37, 94; see also Consumer
Debt—Are Credit Cards Bankrupting Americans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8-10 (2009)
(statement of Adam J. Levitin, Prof., Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.).
25. See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact
Sheet: Reforms to Protect American Credit Card Holders (May 22, 2009), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/fact-sheet-reforms-to-protectamerican-credit-card-holders/ (summarizing Credit CARD Act’s key provisions).
26. See Block, Fed Rules, supra note 23 (noting one consumer advocate’s view
that “ ‘the Fed missed an opportunity to require a rollback of all the outrageous
interest rate hikes consumers have been slammed with in recent years’ ”); Sandra
Block, What You Need to Know About the New Credit Card Reforms, USA TODAY, Feb. 26,
2010, http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/credit/2010-02-22-cardreforms22_
ST_N.htm (detailing potentially harmful practices employed by credit card industry that remain permissible under Credit CARD Act); Credit Card Reform Is Mixed
Blessing, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2010, available at http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2010/feb/22/credit-card-reform-mixed-blessing/print/ (asserting that
Credit CARD Act is less effective than anticipated due to card industry’s ninemonth window within which to increase interest rates, create new fees, and cut
credit lines); Furman & Mcauliff, supra note 23 (detailing consumer advocates’
opinions that final legislation was “watered down” and did not provide for beneficial consumer protections such as caps on interest rates); Kimberly Palmer, Credit
Card Bill Already Affects Consumers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. ALPHA CONSUMER BLOG
(July 28, 2009), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/alpha-consumer/2009/
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concerns protection for the subset of young consumers who incur debt
without the sufficient financial means to repay it.27
The Credit CARD Act primarily seeks to protect college-aged consumers28 by prohibiting certain solicitation practices and by attempting to
limit their access to credit cards.29 By prohibiting consumers under the
age of twenty-one from receiving pre-screened credit offers without their
consent30 and by requiring them to satisfy certain prerequisites before obtaining a card,31 Congress hopes to decrease the negative consequences
that many young cardholders have experienced due to their accumulation
of credit card debt. This Article questions whether the Credit CARD Act’s
narrow approach to protecting young consumers will achieve this goal.
In light of the increased levels of young consumer credit card indebtedness and the negative consequences that befall many college-aged consumers as a result of this debt, this Article asserts that the current
legislation misses an important opportunity to provide greater and more
effective protection for this cohort of consumers. By narrowly focusing on
the availability of credit cards to college-aged consumers, the Credit CARD
Act fails to include provisions that provide protection for young consumers once they obtain and begin to use credit cards.32 This Article also
questions the efficacy of the current provisions, which, in concert with
rules promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board (the Board), appear to
permit issuers’ practice of lending to young, unemployed consumers who
do not possess the financial resources with which to repay their debt.
Therefore, this Article argues that more comprehensive and effective mea7/28/credit-card-bill-already-affects-consumers (discussing Credit CARD Act’s negative short-term effect on consumers as evidenced by credit card industry’s interest
rate increases and balance transfer offer changes); Diana Ransom, Card Sharp:
Where the Credit CARD Act is Falling Short, SMARTMONEY (June 1, 2010), http://www.
smartmoney.com/personal-finance/debt/where-the-card-act-is-falling-short/ (reporting consumer advocates’ concerns that Credit CARD Act did not adequately
address consumer protection issues such as lowering and closing of credit lines
and accounts and payment allocation toward cardholders’ debt).
27. See, e.g., Regina L. Hinson, Note, Credit Card Reform Goes to College, 14 N.C.
BANKING INST. 287 (2010) (discussing strengths and weaknesses of Credit CARD
Act as it relates to young consumers).
28. For purposes of this Article, the term “college-aged consumers” refers to
those consumers who are under the age of twenty-one.
29. See Credit CARD Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, §§ 301-02, 304, 123 Stat. 1734,
1747-48, 1749 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
30. Id. § 302.
31. Id. § 301.
32. While the Credit CARD Act does include a provision requiring cosigner
approval for limit increases on cards for which he/she is jointly liable, which arguably protects young consumers from amassing high balances, this provision is not
applicable to consumers under the age of twenty-one who obtain a card without a
cosigner. See id. § 303. Subject to the Credit CARD Act’s rules regarding consideration of ability to repay, card issuers are free to increase consumers’ credit limits
without their express approval, thereby paving the way for them to sink deeper
into debt. For a proposal to rectify this oversight, see infra notes 245-66.
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sures are needed to help protect the financial and personal futures of college-aged consumers.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the banking industry’s
decision to enter the young consumer market, specifically as it relates to
undergraduate students. It details card issuers’ aggressive marketing and
solicitation efforts that have succeeded in expanding not only the number
of college-aged cardholders but also their levels of indebtedness. Part III
discusses this indebtedness in terms of student cardholders’ increased
rates of credit card usage and the negative consequences that some experience as a result of such use.
Part IV of this Article critiques Congress’s recent efforts to address the
problem of credit card indebtedness among young consumers through
the Credit CARD Act. Although the Act attempts to limit college-aged
consumers’ access to credit cards, this Part argues that such attempts will
likely prove futile for two primary reasons. Both the provisions of the Act
itself and the lenient regulations promulgated by the Board pave the way
for card companies to continue issuing cards to young, unemployed consumers, many of whom may be unable to repay the debt they incur.
In light of this probability, Part V of this Article proposes several measures that could more effectively and comprehensively protect young consumers’ financial and personal futures. The spectrum of proposals range
from prohibiting consumers under the age of twenty-one from obtaining a
credit card to reducing the length of time negative credit card history is
included in young consumers’ credit reports. Depending on the goals
policymakers seek to achieve, one or more of these proposals can be implemented in efforts to both restrict lending to college-aged consumers
who lack the financial resources to repay their debt and lessen the negative financial consequences brought on by excessive debt. The serious
consideration of these and other measures is imperative if lawmakers hope
to have a significant impact on young consumers’ credit card
indebtedness.
II. NEW HORIZONS: THE RISE

OF THE

YOUNG CONSUMER MARKET

Although it is now considered commonplace for unemployed eighteen-year-olds to have ready access to credit cards, this was not always the
case.33 Young consumers’ current accessibility to credit cards is a direct
result of the banking industry’s strategy to target new markets in an effort
to sustain and expand profitability.34 One such market is comprised of
undergraduate student consumers. While card companies’ on-campus
marketing and solicitation efforts have been integral to the expansion of
33. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 166-68.
34. See id.; SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 10, at 135-37;
Ronald J. Mann, Patterns of Credit Card Use Among Low and Moderate Income Households 5-9 (April 10, 2008) [hereinafter Mann, Patterns], available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1119268.
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this market, they have also been widely criticized by lawmakers, consumer
advocates, and university administrators.35 Concerns regarding the industry’s solicitation methods, which, according to some, border on being
predatory and deceptive,36 have prompted university officials and state
and federal lawmakers to implement policies restricting solicitation efforts
that target student consumers. It is their hope that such policies will help
stem the wave of credit card indebtedness that has engulfed this profitable, yet vulnerable, market.
A.

High Risk, High Reward

Prior to the late 1980s, credit card issuers did not aggressively seek to
lend to student consumers.37 Due in part to the financial industry’s “concern that young and impressionable consumers would act irresponsibly
with ‘gifts’ of unearned money,”38 it was standard industry practice to refrain from initiating mass marketing campaigns that targeted young consumers and to require a parental cosigner before approving a college-aged
consumer’s credit card application.39 Both of these practices were consistent with the industry’s initial unitary credit card business model that
sought to reserve lending for non-risky, creditworthy borrowers with reliable streams of income.40 Student consumers, many of whom had (and
continue to have) income generated from part-time and summer jobs or
had no employment income at all,41 did not fit into this category of opti35. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-773, CONSUMER FINANCE: COLSTUDENTS AND CREDIT CARDS 27-28 (2001) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01773.pdf; Lucy Lazarony, Marketing Plastic
to Students Causes Lawmakers, Educators to Melt Down, BANKRATE.COM (June 21, 1999),
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/cc/19990621.asp?keyword=CREDIT
CARDS.
36. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 27-28; Creola Johnson, Maxed Out College Students: A Call to Limit Credit Card Solicitations on College Campuses, 8 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 201-02 (2005); Martin Merzer, Student Credit Card Issuers
Losing Their Welcome on Campus, CREDITCARDS.COM (Dec. 8, 2008), http://www.
creditcards.com/credit-card-news/student-credit-card-issuers-losing-welcome-oncampus-1279.php.
37. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 167 (noting that
“[p]enetration of the student credit card market began in the late 1980s”).
38. Id.
39. See id. at 166-68.
40. See Mann, Patterns, supra note 34, at 4-5; Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The
Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1377 (2008)
[hereinafter Levitin, Priceless].
41. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 35. Although the GAO Report refers to
a study reporting that in 2000, fifty-five and nine percent of college students had
part-time or full-time employment, respectively, students’ discretionary income after paying for education expenses averaged only $195 each month. See id. Considering the fact that most college students carry balances on more than one credit
card, this is not a substantial amount of income with which to pay multiple credit
card bills. See SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 6 (reporting that by time students
are seniors in college, sixty-two percent have four or more cards).
LEGE

R
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mal cardholders.42 The traditional model, however, changed as the banking industry experienced deregulation43 and card issuers began to utilize
more sophisticated underwriting measures that facilitated their ability to
more reliably predict consumers’ spending and payment behavior.44
After effectively developing and employing new technologies to design profitable strategies for market specialization and segmentation,45
card companies have become more willing to issue cards to segments of
the consumer population, such as low-income borrowers, who were previously considered “unacceptably risky.”46 The formerly untapped market
of student consumers has become particularly attractive to the credit card
industry as other market segments have become saturated.47 As noted by
Elizabeth Warren, “[credit card companies] ‘target high-school and college-age people because they see them as the only growth opportunities in
a saturated market.’”48

42. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 166-67.
43. See id. at 167; SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 10, at 19,

R

135.
44. See Mann, Patterns, supra note 34, at 5-6.
45. See id. at 7-9.
46. Id. at 6; see also MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 167 (discussing banks’ strategy to mass market to “struggling middle- and working-class
families”); SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 10, at 129 (discussing card issuers’ aggressive pursuit of “high-risk-high-profit” consumers such as
those with “incomes too low to make more than minimum repayments”); Oren
Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1383 (2004) (attributing credit
card industry’s targeting of “less credit-worthy consumers” to its ability to charge
higher interest rates to this segment of consumers); Andrew P. MacArthur, Pay to
Play: The Poor’s Problems in the BAPCPA, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 407, 478 (2009)
(asserting that “credit card companies have targeted the poor ‘as a source of major
profits’ ” (citation omitted)); Mann, Patterns, supra note 34, at 6-9; Jennifer M.
Smith, Credit Cards, Attorney’s Fees, and the Putative Debtor: A Pyrrhic Victory? Putative
Debtors May Win the Battle but Nevertheless Lose the War, 61 ME. L. REV. 171, 180-81
(2009) (discussing industry’s practice of lending to risky borrowers).
47. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 167 (attributing
banks’ decisions to pursue student consumers to “the saturation of the high-yield
consumer services market”); SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 10,
at 134-37 (discussing market saturation and credit card industry’s strategic response of marketing to poor and young consumers); Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics
of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 142 (2000) (noting that “[t]he credit card market has been saturated for many years and every credit worthy person who wants a
credit card already has one”).
48. Dirk Smillie, Bankrupt by 25: People Under the Age of 25 Make Up the FastestGrowing Age Group Filing for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT, Apr. 5, 2004, available
at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0BUE/is_12_136/ai_n17206851/; see
also SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 10, at 134, 137 (noting that
bank credit card market was considered by industry experts to be 80.5% saturated
in 1980); Johnson, supra note 36, at 201-02 (noting that credit card companies
aggressively market to college students because “students entering college are the
only adult demographic group largely made up of non-credit card holders”).
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Every day, new prospective cardholders reach the age of eighteen and
become contractually eligible to independently obtain a credit card.49
Card issuers are eager to lend to these new customers for two primary
reasons: customer loyalty and profitability.50 Research indicates that many
consumers develop long-lasting relationships with their card companies.51
This also appears to be the case for young student cardholders, many of
whom remain customers of their first credit card company for fifteen years
or more.52 As admitted by Bank of America spokeswoman Betty Riess,
“‘[Bank of America’s] objective in serving the student market is to create
the foundation for a long-term banking relationship.’”53 Issuers seek to
capitalize on this relationship by cross-marketing products and services
with other companies and by offering to meet cardholders’ future financial services needs, ranging from student loans to mortgages.54
Card companies also target young consumers because they provide
long-term profitability for issuers.55 Considering that a significant portion
of the card industry’s revenues are generated by interest income,56 card49. In most states, eighteen is the age of majority for entering into contracts,
including credit card agreements. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.3, at
221-22 (4th ed. 2004).
50. See Kimberly M. Gartner & Elizabeth R. Schiltz, What’s Your Score? Educating College Students About Credit Card Debt, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 401, 404
(2005) (discussing student market’s attractiveness to banking industry in terms of
“ ‘the importance of establishing early relationships with customers and issuing a
person’s first card’ ” and “the potential profitability” of market) (citation omitted).
51. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 50, 68-69 (1991) (discussing effects of search/switch costs
on card companies’ ability to create and profit from “a base of ‘loyal customers’ ”).
But see Zywicki, supra note 47, at 141-42 & n.250 (discussing industry claims that
many issuers have difficulties retaining customers due to plethora of direct mail
promotions offered by competitors).
52. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 167; AnnaMaria Andriotis, Credit-Card Issuers’ New College Strategies, SMARTMONEY (Feb. 24, 2010), http:/
/www.smartmoney.com/personal-finance/college-planning/credit-card-issuersnew-college-strategies/.
53. Ben Protess & Jeannette Neumann, Banks Paying Colleges for Students Who
Rack Up Credit Card Debt, THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 8, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/08/banks-paying-colleges-for_n_604109.html.
54. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 167.
55. Although some issuers assert that student cardholders are not as profitable as non-student consumers, the industry continues to pursue the student market
because student cardholder accounts “[become] more profitable than nonstudents’ accounts” following students’ graduation from college. See GAO REPORT,
supra note 35, at 35.
56. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 135 (reporting that “interest payments account for more than 80 percent of the profits of credit issuers”); see also
CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., FACTS ABOUT CONSUMER CREDIT CARD DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY 3, available at http://www.nacba.com/files/new_in_debate/Credit_Card_
Debt_Bankruptcy.pdf (reporting that seventy-five percent of issuers’ revenues are
comprised of interest paid by cardholders who carry over balances from month to
month); Jaclyn Rodriguez, Note, The Credit CARD Act of 2009: An Effective but Incomplete Solution Evidencing the Need for a Federal Regulator, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 309,
323-24 (2010) (discussing profitability of interest payments for credit card issuers).
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holders who fail to pay their balances in full each month are more profitable to card companies than those who do not.57 Not surprisingly, most
student consumers fall into the former category. According to one survey,
in 2008, only seventeen percent of student cardholders reported paying
their balances in full each month.58 This percentage is considerably lower
than the fifty-five percent of cardholders in the general population who, in
2007, reported that they usually pay their balances in full each month.59
In addition, because student cardholders often do not have established
credit histories, card companies can charge them higher interest rates.60
The payment of these higher interest rates further enlarges issuers’
profitability.
The fact that the vast majority of student consumers are “borrowers”
instead of “convenience users”61 impacts issuers’ ability to generate not
only interest revenues but also fee income from this profitable segment of
consumers. As noted by Ronald Mann, “once the borrower begins to carry
a balance, the likelihood of late and overlimit fees can increase substantially.”62 Unfortunately, numerous student borrowers have found themselves paying such fees,63 thereby contributing to the $20 billion in late
and overlimit fees that the card industry was able to collect in 2009.64
57. As noted by Ronald Mann:
Financially secure customers or “convenience users” do not generate any
interest income, late fees, or overlimit penalties. The only source of revenue they provide typically comes from annual fees in some instances and
interchange revenues. These charges might be substantial in some cases,
but they account for only about 20% of industry revenues. Thus, for issuers that rely on lending, “convenience users” are useful only because of
the possibility that they will mature into borrowers—as caterpillars mature into butterflies.
For the credit card lender, the first hint of sustained profitability comes
when the cardholder (now borrower) stops regularly paying her balance
in full each month.
Mann, Sweat Box, supra note 18, at 385.
58. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 14.
59. See Brian K. Bucks et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2004 to 2007:
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., Feb. 12, 2009, at A1,
A46, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2009/pdf/scf09.
pdf; see also Mann, Sweat Box, supra note 18, at 385 n.54.
60. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 7, 39-40.
61. For the distinction between “convenience users” and “borrowers,” see
supra note 57.
62. Mann, Sweat Box, supra note 18, at 386.
63. See EDMUND MIERZWINSKI ET AL., U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP
EDUC. FUND, THE CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP: A SURVEY OF COLLEGE STUDENTS AND
CREDIT CARD MARKETING 6 (2008), available at http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.
org/assets/ymirZbG5OLxH2NPUxQENdA/correctedthecampuscreditcardtrap
mar08all.pdf (reporting that percentage of student cardholders who reported having paid at least one late fee or over-limit fee was twenty-five and fifteen percent,
respectively).
64. For a discussion of late and over-the-limit fees, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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As the young consumer market continues to expand,65 so do issuers’
abilities to collect more interchange fees from merchants. An interchange
fee is a percentage (usually ranging from one to three percent) of every
credit card transaction that a merchant pays to the issuer.66 Professor
Adam Levitin cautions that “[b]ecause interchange is based on transaction
volume, it creates an incentive for banks to issue as many cards as possible,
regardless of the creditworthiness of the borrower. By creating a huge
revenue stream unrelated to credit risk, interchange encourages card issuers to engage in reckless lending . . . .”67 These concerns are particularly
salient when one considers the marketing and solicitation efforts that card
companies have employed in their attempts to expand the student consumer market.
B.

Marketing to the Inexperienced Masses

Having abandoned former policies of not marketing or lending to
college-aged consumers, credit card companies now welcome young cardholders and encourage their accumulation of debt through aggressive solicitation and marketing efforts. Their solicitation strategies have ranged
from on-campus mass marketing campaigns such as “tabling,” which is
often accompanied by free giveaways such as pens, t-shirts, and pizza,68 to
entering into financial partnerships with universities, alumni associations,
and student organizations to solicit new customers. In 2009, credit card
issuers entered into 1,044 such partnership or “affinity” agreements69 and
“made total payments of $83,462,712 to institutions and organizations pur65. For a further discussion of the growth of the young consumer market, see
supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text and infra Part III.A (discussing statistics and
gravity of credit card usage and debt).
66. See Levitin, Priceless, supra note 40, at 1333; see also Levitin & Zywicki, supra
note 24, at 75-76.
67. Levitin & Zywicki, supra note 24, at 76.
68. Tabling is a marketing strategy whereby card issuers and vendors erect
and staff tables on which to display and distribute promotional materials and
credit card applications. The tables are often set up in or near high traffic areas
such as student unions and dining halls. Tabling also occurs at university-sponsored events such as athletic competitions. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 7
n.8; see also CHERYL HYSTAD & BRAD HEAVNER, GRADUATING INTO DEBT: CREDIT
CARD MARKETING ON MARYLAND COLLEGE CAMPUSES 8 (2004) [hereinafter GRADUATING INTO DEBT], available at http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/bIzK3y
7l5ovX-ALVTKnhog/CreditCard04.pdf; Johnson, supra note 36, at 191-92.
69. Such partnerships are often referred to as “affinity” relationships whereby
the card issuer pays a sponsoring organization a fee in exchange for access to the
group’s membership contact information and its use of the organization’s logo on
the credit card. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 7 n.9, 27-28, 30-31; MANNING,
CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 162; MIERZWINSKI ET AL., supra note 63, at 34, 7-9; Johnson, supra note 36, at 191-93, 198, 202-04, 233-36; Dylan Williams et al.,
An Investigation into Credit Card Debt Among College Students, 1 CONTEMP. ISSUES IN
EDUC. RES. 43, 43 (2008), available at http://www.cluteinstitute-onlinejournals.
com/PDFs/1127.pdf. Card issuers are now required to submit copies of their partnership agreements to the Federal Reserve Board. See Credit CARD Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-24, § 305, 123 Stat. 1734, 1749-50 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1637). For a
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suant to these agreements.”70 Card companies have also solicited collegeaged consumers through direct mail71 and internet marketing.72
Based upon the belief that many college-aged consumers lack financial experience and knowledge,73 some consumer advocates question the
ethical implications of aggressively marketing to this potentially vulnerable
class of consumers.74 Some assert that credit card companies take advantage of young consumers’ naiveté and “‘lack of financial awareness.’”75
Banking industry representatives, however, contest these claims and
“maintain[ ] that students are independent adults who rely on credit cards
for essential expenses, such as schoolbooks and emergencies, and that assuming they’ll take on more debt because of free T-shirts insults their intelligence.”76 Although this industry contention may accurately describe
many student consumers,77 university officials and state and federal
lawmakers have become so concerned about issuers’ pervasive marketing
and solicitation efforts that they have enacted policies and laws to restrict
such efforts targeting college-aged consumers.
further discussion of the relationship between credit card companies and universities, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
70. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
COLLEGE CREDIT CARD AGREEMENTS 1 (2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditcard/2010/downloads/CCAP_October_
web.pdf.
71. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 19 (reporting studies’ findings that
majority of students (thirty-six to thirty-seven percent) “obtained their cards by
responding to mail offers”).
72. See GRADUATING INTO DEBT, supra note 68, at 8.
73. See ROBERT MANNING, LIVING WITH DEBT 37-39 (2005) [hereinafter MANNING, LIVING WITH DEBT], available at http://www.lendingtree.com/livingwith
debt/collateral/full_report.pdf; see also KIT YARROW & JAYNE O’DONNELL, GEN BUY:
HOW TWEENS, TEENS, AND TWENTY-SOMETHINGS ARE REVOLUTIONIZING RETAIL 67
(2009); Johnson, supra note 36, at 225–30; Cliff A. Robb & Deanna L. Sharpe, Effect
of Personal Financial Knowledge on College Students’ Credit Card Behavior, 20 J. FIN.
COUNSELING & PLANNING 25, 27 (2009).
74. See Laurie A. Lucas, Integrative Social Contracts Theory: Ethical Implications of
Marketing Credit Cards to U.S. College Students, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 413, 422-26 (2001)
(concluding that issuers’ direct marketing to U.S. college students “should be considered unethical under the [Integrative Social Contracts Theory] framework”); see
also Johnson, supra note 36, at 197-98, 265-67 (advocating for legislative intervention regarding credit card marketing “to combat the potential exploitation of college students by credit card companies”).
75. Kimberly Palmer & Emily Brandon, The Rush to Push Plastic: Companies Use
Free Food and Facebook to Lure Students, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 28, 2008, at 58
[hereinafter Palmer, Rush to Push Plastic], available at 2008 WLNR 1048324; see also
Johnson, supra note 36, at 267.
76. Palmer & Brandon, supra note 75, at 58.
77. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 20 (reporting that occasional and
emergency expenses and books and school supplies accounted for sixty-seven and
fifty-seven percent, respectively, of students’ credit card charges); see also SALLIE
MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 11 (reporting that in 2008, ninety-two percent of student cardholders used their card for school-related expenses).
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University policies have ranged from requiring credit card issuers and
vendors to “register, pay a fee, and comply with specific polices”78 to completely banning them from campus.79 States such as Arkansas and Louisiana have passed legislation banning certain on-campus marketing
strategies such as the distribution of gifts to consumers under twenty-one80
and the solicitation of undergraduate students during periods of class registration.81 The recently enacted Credit CARD Act also includes provisions restricting card companies’ solicitation practices on or near college
campuses and at college-sponsored events.82
Despite these efforts to curtail on-campus marketing to student consumers, students continue to acquire cards and amass significant amounts
of credit card debt at alarming rates.83 This trend could be explained in
part by the fact that a majority of students obtain their credit cards online
(sixteen percent) and through direct mail solicitations (thirty-eight per78. Johnson, supra note 36, at 233; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 2528 (reporting colleges’ various solicitation policies); MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 162 (noting that during 2000-2001 academic year, over 800
higher education institutions formulated restriction policies); Jack Phillips, Cuomo,
SUNY Announce Credit Card Protection for Students, EPOCH TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010, at A8
(discussing SUNY’s adoption of code of conduct that limits time and location of
on-campus credit card marketing).
79. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 231-32 n.171 (discussing universities’ oncampus solicitation policies, including examples of schools that have banned marketers from their campuses); Lazarony, supra note 35 (reporting that in 1999, approximately 300 colleges and universities banned on-campus solicitations); see also
Ron Matus, Students Are Still Hooked on Plastic, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 3, 2004,
http://www.sptimes.com/2004/08/03/Tampabay/Students_are_still_ho.shtml
(noting that several colleges in Florida have barred credit card issuers from oncampus solicitations); Merzer, supra note 36 (discussing Florida Atlantic University’s decision to ban credit card marketers from its seven campuses).
80. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-104-202, 4-104-203 (West 2010). The legislation
also prohibits solicitation inside an academic building or within 100 feet of an
academic building and requires colleges and universities to include a credit seminar during freshman orientation if they permit solicitations at athletic events. See
id.
81. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3351.2 (2010). For a detailed list of other
states that had enacted or proposed legislation addressing on-campus marketing
and solicitation from 1999 to 2001, see GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 53-66. More
recently, in 2009, Illinois passed the Credit Card Marketing Act of 2009, which
regulates credit card marketing to undergraduate students. See 110 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. §§ 26/1-/97 (2009).
82. See Credit Card Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 304, 123 Stat. 1734, 1749
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 1650) (prohibiting card companies engaged in solicitation
on or near campus or at college-sponsored event from offering “tangible items” to
induce students to apply for credit cards).
83. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 231 n.171 (citing research “finding that students on campus which had banned on-campus solicitation actually carried higher
balances (average balance $1079) than students at universities that permitted oncampus solicitation (average balance $792)”) (citing Mary Beth Pinto et. al., Credit
Card Solicitation Policies in Higher Education: Does “Protecting” Our Students Make a
Difference?, 42 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 169, 170 (2001).
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cent) rather than from on-campus vendor booths (five percent).84 The
Credit CARD Act now prohibits card issuers from sending prescreened
credit card offers to young consumers under twenty-one unless they consented to receiving such offers.85 It remains to be seen whether this restriction will significantly reduce the number of direct mail solicitations
received by young consumers86 and, consequently, their levels of credit
card indebtedness. As the next part details, students’ credit card debt has
significantly increased over the past decade resulting in negative financial
and personal consequences for many young consumers.
III. DEBT BECOMES THEM
For the past several years, young consumers, especially college students, have turned to credit cards to finance everything from clothes
to college education.87 Although many college-aged consumers receive
their first credit card before entering college,88 university campuses
across the country serve as breeding grounds for student consumer
indebtedness. Whether fueled by skyrocketing tuition and fees coupled
with diminishing student aid89 or by students “liv[ing] beyond their
84. See supra note 68; see also SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 7.
85. See Credit CARD Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 302.
86. In 2010, Professor Jim Hawkins conducted a survey of 338 University of
Houston undergraduate students to examine the impact of the Credit CARD Act
on college campuses. See Jim Hawkins, The CARD Act on Campus (2010) (data
results on file with author). His preliminary results found that notwithstanding the
Act’s marketing restrictions, seventy-six percent of students surveyed reported having received a credit card offer in the mail since the beginning of 2010. Id. Only
twenty-four percent had not. Id.
87. In 2008, ninety-two percent of undergraduate cardholders reported using
their cards for college expenses. See SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 11.
88. According to a recent survey conducted by Sallie Mae, thirty-nine percent
of students had obtained a credit card before beginning their freshman year. This
2008 figure marked a sixteen percent increase since 2004. See id. at 6; see also Joyce
M. Wolburg & James Pokrywcznski, A Psychographic Analysis of Generation Y College
Students, J. ADVERTISING RES., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 33, 36 (reporting that many eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds received credit card cosigned by parent during high
school).
89. A number of sources are useful in informing the discussion as to the impact that increased educational costs have on student debt. See MANNING, CREDIT
CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 163-66; LINDA NAZARETH, THE LEISURE ECONOMY:
HOW CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS, ECONOMICS, AND GENERATIONAL ATTITUDES WILL
RESHAPE OUR LIVES AND OUR INDUSTRIES 109-10 (2007); see also As College Costs Rise,
Student Loans Are Harder to Find, INSIDE THE VAULT, Fall 2009, 1, 3-4, available at
http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/pub_assets/pdf/itv/2009/ITV_fall_09.
pdf (discussing trends of escalating college costs and decreasing student loan availability); Jay MacDonald, Lenders Curtail College Student Loans, CREDITCARDS.COM
(Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/lenders-cut-backon-private-student-loans-1279.php (discussing lenders’ curtailment of private student loans during time in which “the average cost of tuition at four-year public and
private colleges and universities [has risen] more than 20 percent, from $21,235 to
$26,833”); SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 11-12 (reporting that in 2008, thirty
percent of undergraduate cardholders used their credit cards to pay for college
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means”90 in attempts to conform to perceived peer expectations,91 the
prevalence of credit card usage by college students is troubling, especially
when one considers the negative academic, personal, and financial consequences that many experience as a result of such usage. Such detrimental
effects necessitate young consumer credit card reforms in addition to
those currently included in the Credit CARD Act.
A.

College Students’ Credit Card Usage

Several scholars and researchers have detailed young consumers’ general lack of financial experience and knowledge,92 both of which contribute to the suboptimal and detrimental financial decisions or “mistakes”
that many young consumers make.93 Unfortunately, many of these mistakes are made on college campuses as student consumers apply for and
use credit cards without fully contemplating or understanding the consequences associated with credit card debt.94 Obviously, there are many stutuition and fees). But see Daniel de Vise, Financial Aid Rising Faster than Tuition,
WASH. POST COLLEGE INC. BLOG (June 29, 2010, 12:41 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/college-inc/2010/06/aid_rising_faster_than_tuition.html (reporting
that for second consecutive year, tuition increases have been “in the 4-percent
range” as compared to six percent “[d]uring the 10 years prior to the recession”
and that students are receiving larger student aid packages due to increases in
institutional aid budgets).
90. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 3; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 35,
at 9 (noting that “[t]he convenience of credit cards may tempt students to live
beyond their means”).
91. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 170-77 (discussing
strong influence of peer pressure and need to belong can have on students’ accumulation of debt); YARROW & O’DONNELL, supra note 73, at 51-52, 108-13 (discussing how young consumers’ purchasing decisions are influenced by their desire
to join and connect with peer groups); Craig A. Martin & L.W. Turley, Malls and
Consumption Motivation: An Exploratory Examination of Older Generation Y Consumers,
32 INT’L J. RETAIL & DISTRIBUTION MGMT. 464, 470-71 (2004) (describing many
young consumers as socially motivated consumers who are image-conscious and
driven by opinions of others).
92. See supra note 73; see also Troy Adams & Monique Moore, High-Risk Health
and Credit Behavior Among 18- to 25-Year-Old College Students, 56 J. AMER. COLL.
HEALTH 101, 101 (2007) (summarizing research findings that “lack of knowledge”
and “psychological characteristics, such as self-control and beliefs about money”
may affect students’ credit behavior); Annamaria Lusardi et al., Financial Literacy
Among the Young: Evidence and Implications for Consumer Policy 4-5, 11 (Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 9, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1459141.
93. See Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions over the LifeCycle with Implications for Regulation 12-20 (Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity,
Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=973790 (discussing
research findings evidencing “U-shaped age-related curve in the prices people pay
for ten financial choices” indicating that majority of costly financial mistakes are
made by “young borrowers [who] have low levels of experience” and “older borrowers [who] have . . . lower levels of analytic function”).
94. See Kathleen Arano & Carl Parker, Modeling Credit Card Borrowing by Students 6 (Sw. Econ. Rev., Working Paper, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1140767 (“Students are more likely to be impulsive and fall prey to instant
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dent consumers who are financially sophisticated and make prudent
financial decisions;95 however, recent studies show that credit card indebtedness remains a problem for a number of student cardholders.96
In 2004, seventy-six percent of college undergraduate students had
credit cards.97 By 2008, this number had increased to eighty-four percent.98 Not surprisingly, the amount of credit card debt college students
amassed during this time also increased.99 In 2004, college students had
an average of $2,169 in credit card debt.100 By 2008, students’ average
credit card debt had increased to $3,173.101
Student cardholders are not only accumulating more credit card
debt, but they are also acquiring debt at earlier ages. In 2004, fifty-six
percent of students reported obtaining their first card at the age of eighteen.102 From fall 2004 to spring 2008, the percentage of freshmen with
credit cards rose from forty-two percent to sixty-seven percent, a sixty percent increase.103 Of this sixty-seven percent, only fifteen percent had a
zero balance, compared to sixty-nine percent in 2004.104 The percentage
of freshmen carrying four or more cards also increased during this period
from fifteen percent to twenty-three percent.105
Perhaps more troubling are the figures illustrating students’ credit
card indebtedness as they progress through their college careers. By the
time students reach their senior year, eighty-eight percent of them have at
least one credit card and sixty-two percent have four or more cards.106
gratification by using credit cards to finance consumption, and may place less importance on the future implications and consequences of going into debt.”); see
also GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 9 (noting consumer advocates’, college administrators’, and debt counselors’ concerns “that students may not understand the
consequences of incurring excessive debt and making payments late”).
95. See supra note 8.
96. See Arano & Parker, supra note 94, at 1 (referring to studies that “found
that although a majority of the students are responsible and can handle their
credit well, there is a significant minority who were having problems”).
97. NAZARETH, supra note 89, at 110; SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 5.
98. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 5.
99. See RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 177 (2006) [hereinafter MANN, CHARGING AHEAD] (noting
that credit cards “are associated with substantial increases in consumer spending
and borrowing levels”); Cathy Bakewell & Vincent-Wayne Mitchell, Generation Y
Female Consumer Decision-Making Styles, 31 INT’L J. RETAIL & DISTRIBUTION MGMT. 95,
98 (2003) (noting that “access to credit is a contributory factor in . . .
overspending”).
100. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 5.
101. Id.
102. NAZARETH, supra note 89, at 110.
103. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 6; see also MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 170 (reporting that percentage of students who receive
their first credit card by end of their freshman year is nearly eighty percent).
104. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 9.
105. Id. at 6.
106. Id.
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While freshmen carry an average of $2,038 in credit card debt, seniors’
average outstanding debt more than doubles this amount, totaling
$4,138.107 Nineteen percent of seniors carry balances greater than $7,000
compared to only five percent of freshmen.108 These figures are particularly disconcerting when one considers the amount of student loan debt
that many students are also incurring.109
According to a recent report issued by The Project on Student Debt,
“around two-thirds of students graduating from four-year colleges had student loan debt [and] [t]he average amount these students owe has grown
about six percent per year since 2003-04, reaching $23,200 for the class of
2008.”110 When coupled with a 10.6% unemployment rate for recent college graduates,111 young consumers’ ability to successfully manage repayment of both their student loan and credit card debt is severely
hindered.112
Although some researchers and industry representatives often argue
that most college consumers successfully manage their credit card debt,113
many consumer advocates counter that such assertions are exaggerated
and overstated.114 Take, for instance, the reported percentage of college
107. Id. at 8; see also MIERZWINSKI ET AL., supra note 63, at 6 (reporting findings
from 2008 study showing that college seniors carry more than double amount of
credit card debt as freshmen).
108. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 9.
109. See Susan Tompor, Student Loan Debt Exceeds Credit Card Debt in USA, USA
TODAY, Sept. 10, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/college/2010-0910-student-loan-debt_N.htm (reporting that outstanding student loan debt ($850
billion) exceeds outstanding revolving debt ($828 billion), which is primarily comprised of credit card debt).
110. MATTHEW REED ET AL., THE PROJECT ON STUDENT DEBT, STUDENT DEBT
AND THE CLASS OF 2008 1 (2009), available at http://projectonstudentdebt.org/
files/pub/classof2008.pdf.
111. Id.
112. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 3 (expressing concern about students’
ability to pay both their credit card bills and student loans following graduation
from college).
113. See supra note 8; see also MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at
169 (refuting industry representative’s assertion that “ ‘[c]ollege students can pay,
do pay and are using their plastic cards responsibly’ ”) (citation omitted); Matus,
supra note 79 (quoting spokeswoman from American Bankers Association as stating that “ ‘[college students] are actually more responsible’ ” than greater consumer population in terms of paying their balance in full each month); Merzer,
supra note 36 (according to banking industry spokesman, “ ‘Anecdotes of student
problems in the card area fail to paint the real picture that students, as a broader
group, are in fact managing their credit obligations well . . . .’ ”); Staten & Barron,
supra note 8, at 25 (concluding that research did not show that student cardholders “are misusing cards so frequently as to warrant singling them out as a group for
special protections from marketing solicitations”). But see Robert D. Manning &
Ray Kirshak, Credit Cards on Campus: Academic Inquiry, Objective Empiricism, or Advocacy Research?, 35 NASFAA J. STUDENT FIN. AID 39, 39 (2005) (critiquing Staten and
Barron’s conclusions and objectivity of their research).
114. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 161 (describing industry’s research as “methodologically flawed”); id. at 169 (characterizing industry
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cardholders who pay their balances in full every month.115 According to
various sources, this number has declined from fifty-nine percent in
1998116 to seventeen percent in 2008.117 Consumer advocates such as
Robert Manning argue that because these figures do not account for the
number of students whose parents pay their bills for them or who use
student loans to pay their bills, they mask the complexity and gravity of
students’ indebtedness.118
In fact, one could argue that this precipitous ten-year decline in the
percentage of students paying off their balances each month and, thereby,
avoiding costly finance charges is further evidence of students’ mismanagement of credit and debt. As noted in a recent consumer study, “maintaining a good credit history is only part of the story when managing
credit. Reducing finance charges is an important part of debt reduction
and . . . help[s] consumers to balance [their] budgets.”119 The financial
costs borne by college students who have revolving debt are often exacerbated by the negative academic and personal consequences that many experience as a result of their credit card usage—consequences that
detrimentally impact both their current and future lives.
reported data and conclusions as “misleading,” “unreliable,” and “obscur[ing] . . .
the complexity of student credit card debt”); Johnson, supra note 36, at 223 n.135
(discussing and critiquing credit card industry’s research related to student debt
management); Merzer, supra note 36 (discussing consumer group research that
shows greater credit card usage by college students than that reported in industry
studies); see also Lazarony, supra note 35 (discussing Dr. Manning’s claims that
“past studies of students and credit cards have under-reported the problem”). But
see Michael E. Staten & John M. Barron, Credit Cards on Campus: Academic Inquiry,
Objective Empiricism, or Advocacy Research? A Response, 35 NASFAA J. STUDENT FIN.
AID 49, 49-50 (2005) (asserting that Dr. Manning stands to gain financially by exaggerating severity of “the student credit card problem”).
115. For a detailed discussion of studies reporting the percentage of college
cardholders who pay their balances in full every month, see Johnson, supra note
36, at 222 n.136.
116. THE EDUCATION RESOURCES INSTITUTE (TERI), CREDIT RISK OR CREDIT
WORTHY? COLLEGE STUDENTS AND CREDIT CARDS 11 (1998), available at http://
www.ihep.org/assets/files//publications/A-F/CreditRiskWorthy.pdf.
117. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 14.
118. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 176-77 (discussing
“increasingly popular practice” of students using loans to pay credit card bills); id.
at 186 (recounting one consumer’s practice of using at least half of her Stafford
student loan disbursements to pay down her credit cards); Johnson, supra note 36,
at 224 (reporting research findings that “73% of freshmen and 67% of upperclassmen had used student loans to pay off credit card balances”); Lazarony, supra note
35 (citing student loan refinancing and private debt consolidation loans as measures that mask college students’ true levels of credit card debt); Matus, supra note
79 (reporting Dr. Manning’s estimate that twenty percent of college students use
student loans to hide their more than $10,000 credit card indebtedness); see also
Staten & Barron, supra note 8, at 25 (acknowledging “that the relative performance
of student accounts improves over time in part because parents of college students
may intervene to help pay the monthly credit card bills”).
119. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 14.
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Paying the High Price for Credit

For several college cardholders, their accumulation of debt has significant ramifications for their academic and personal lives. Some full-time
students who feel pressure to work more hours to pay their bills reduce
their course load or enter part-time programs.120 Unfortunately, some
also opt to withdraw from school for a semester or year to facilitate their
efforts to work and pay down their debt.121 Studies also show that students with greater credit card debt have a more difficult time managing
their debt and are more likely to have lower grade point averages.122 As
some students become preoccupied with addressing their debt problems,
their academic performance suffers due to a lack of concentration and
priority placed on course work.123
For many young consumers, debt-induced academic pressures are
often coupled with negative personal consequences ranging from stress to
depression.124 Research shows that a significant percentage of college
consumers experience high levels of payment anxiety.125 Of the students
surveyed, only thirteen percent reported feeling no anxiety regarding
their ability to pay their credit card bills while forty-five percent felt extremely or highly anxious.126 There have also been cases, albeit extremely
rare, where payment anxiety and other factors have contributed to debtladen students’ decisions to take their own lives.127
Contrary to previously discussed industry contentions regarding how
well college cardholders manage their debt,128 students’ mismanagement
of debt is evidenced not only by the aforementioned academic and personal consequences but also by the financial costs that many must bear as
a result of their credit card usage. For instance, a recent study conducted
by the U.S. Public Interest Research Group found that twenty-five percent
of students surveyed had paid at least one late fee while fifteen percent of
respondents had paid at least one over-the-limit fee.129 Another study reported that in a given month, 18.4% of student accounts were assessed late
and over-the-limit fees as compared to only 12.5% of accounts held by
older adults.130 Further findings show that while only five percent of
120. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 209; Lazarony, supra note 35.
121. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 33-34; Lazarony, supra note 35.
122. See DAVID L. TAN, OKLAHOMA COLLEGE STUDENT CREDIT CARD STUDY 5
(2003), available at http://pdfcast.org/pdf/oklahoma-college-student-credit-cardstudy.
123. See id. at 5.
124. See Gartner & Schiltz, supra note 50, at 425-26; Johnson, supra note 36, at
209-10.
125. See SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 15.
126. Id.
127. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 160-61; Johnson,
supra note 36, at 208 n.82.
128. See supra notes 8, 95, 113 and accompanying text.
129. MIERZWINSKI ET AL., supra note 63, at 6.
130. Staten & Barron, supra note 8, at 15.
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older adult cardholders were either at or over their credit limit, twelve
percent of students had either reached or gone over their credit limit.131
Student cardholders and young consumers also experience higher delinquency rates than older consumers, and their accounts are more often
past due compared to those held by older adults.132 “[T]he 90-day delinquency rate of student accounts (3.1%) is nearly triple that of older adults
and 29% higher than that of non-student young adults.”133 In addition,
although having their cards for a relatively short period of time, over six
percent of students had so mismanaged their card usage that the issuer
canceled their card for delinquent behavior.134 These literal and figurative “costs” are compounded by the negative impact such delinquencies
can have on students’ credit reports—reports that, in many cases, adversely affect their financial futures for years to come.135
Two common, long-term economic consequences of students’ mishandling of debt are their inability to qualify for subsequent loans and to
receive favorable interest rates on the loans for which they do qualify.136
When many college cardholders seek to purchase a car or home, they
often find that their previous failures to make card payments on time or
their over-the-limit delinquencies have negatively affected their credit
scores.137 In light of the fact that such scores are often a paramount factor in lenders’ decisions,138 having an adverse credit history can negatively
131. Id. at 12.
132. See The Importance of Financial Literacy Among College Students: Hearing Before
the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 24 (2002) (statement
of Michael E. Staten, Prof., McDonough Sch. of Bus., Georgetown Univ.) (“Delinquency rates on both student accounts and young adult, nonstudent accounts are
higher than for older adult accountholders. In a given month, 12 percent of active
student accounts are past due, versus about 11 percent for other young adults
under age 25 and 8 percent for adults 25 and older.”).
133. Staten & Barron, supra note 8, at 17.
134. See MIERZWINSKI, ET AL., supra note 63, at 6; see also Staten & Barron, supra
note 8, at 18 (reporting data showing that greater percent of charge-offs occurred
for student and non-student young consumer accounts than older adult accounts).
135. See Merzer, supra note 36.
136. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 9-10; Johnson, supra note 36, at 21517; Susan Donaldson James, Credit Borrowing Tightens for Under-21s, ABC NEWS/
MONEY, Aug. 21, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/credit-card-law-stranglescollege-student-borrowing/story?id=8357735; Matus, supra note 79.
137. As explained by Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, and Chunlin
Liu:
A credit score, whether a generic FICO score or an internal behavior
score, is an index constructed to evaluate an individual’s relative risk of
default conditional on his/her profile. For example, a lower FICO score
implies a higher probability of a consumer defaulting on his outstanding
debt in the next 24 months.
Sumit Agarwal et al., The Importance of Adverse Selection in the Credit Card Market:
Evidence from Randomized Trials of Credit Card Solicitation, 42 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 743, 746 (2010).
138. Joe Nocera, Credit Score Is the Tyrant in Lending, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2010,
at B1 (noting that credit scores have essentially become most important factor in
banks and underwriters’ lending decisions); Shedding Light on Credit Scores, CREDIT
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impact young consumers’ future borrowing opportunities and the terms
on which they borrow. As noted by Ronald Mann:
In truth, the most effective lever the credit card lender has is the
threat of damaging the credit report of the borrower. A credit
card debtor that does not pay will suffer a substantially lower
credit rating. Although the lower credit card rating will have
only a limited impact on the debtor’s access to credit card debt, it
will substantially increase the cost of subsequent borrowing.139
In dire situations, some young consumers experience perhaps the
most costly financial consequence of debt—bankruptcy.140 In 1999, eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds accounted for 6.9% of debtors filing for
bankruptcy.141 This figure represented a fifty-one percent growth rate of
bankruptcy filings for consumers under the age of twenty-five from 1991 to
1999.142 In 2001, consumers in this age group accounted for 150,000
bankruptcy filings.143 Interestingly, the percentage distribution of bankruptcy petitioners under the age of twenty-five has declined over the years
from 8.7% in 1991 to 4.2% in 2007.144 As Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth
Warren, and Teresa A. Sullivan acknowledge:
The corresponding decline in filing rates among young Americans might signal better financial security than that enjoyed by
their earlier counterparts. . . . However, the fact that previous
generations show a sharp rise in filings among those in early middle age may signal instead that people are living with financial
stress for years, putting off the day of reckoning in bankruptcy
for as long as possible.145
Because bankruptcy filings are included in consumers’ credit reports
for ten years,146 they can have long-term financial and personal ramifications for many debtors.147
CARD MGMT., Jan. 3, 2005, at 20, 20 (discussing that while most consumers realize
that lenders use credit scores in making lending decisions, they do not realize that
poor score will result in higher interest rates on various purchases as compared to
effects of good credit score).
139. Mann, Patterns, supra note 34, at 4.
140. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 11-14.
141. Id. at 13.
142. Id. at 14; see also Johnson, supra note 36, at 218 (reporting that from 1995
to 2000, “the number of people under the age of twenty-six who filed for bankruptcy tripled”).
143. See Smillie, supra note 48.
144. Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren & Teresa A. Sullivan, The Increasing
Vulnerability of Older Americans: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Court, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 87, 94 (2009).
145. Id. at 88 n.1.
146. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 605(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(1)
(2006).
147. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 218.
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In addition, young consumers’ poor credit histories can negatively affect their prospective employment and professional opportunities. Employers are increasingly checking prospective employees’ credit reports
prior to hiring.148 Therefore, unbeknownst to many college students,
“their employment prospects are limited due to their college legacy of
credit card debt.”149
When considering the impact of credit card debt on the lives of college-aged consumers, it is important to consider an emerging trend that
suggests that young consumers, including students, are choosing to use
debit cards more often than credit cards.150 This occurrence could be
attributable to the growing practice of colleges and universities partnering

148. A recent study conducted by the Society for Human Resource Management reported that thirteen percent of organizations surveyed conducted credit
background checks on all job applicants. See SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING: CONDUCTING CREDIT BACKGROUND CHECKS 3 (2010), available at
http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Pages/BackgroundChecking.aspx. Forty-seven percent reported conducting checks on selected job candidates. Id.; see also MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at
177; Johnson, supra note 36, at 214. There have been state and federal legislative
initiatives to address this issue. To date, three states have banned employers’ use
of credit reports to pre-screen prospective employees: Washington, Hawaii, and
Oregon. Representative Steve Cohen from Tennessee is pursing federal legislation
to ban the practice nationally. See Dana Dratch, States Weigh Limits on Credit Checks
for Employment, CREDITCARDS.COM (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.creditcards.com/
credit-card-news/states-weigh-limits-credit-checks-for-employment-1282.php; Jessica Hoch, Law Bans Employment Credit Checks, OREGONBUSINESS (July 6, 2010),
http://www.oregonbusiness.com/the-latest/3766-law-bans-employment-creditchecks; see also Andrew Martin, As a Hiring Filter, Credit Checks Draw Questions, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010, at B1.
149. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 177; see also MANNING,
LIVING WITH DEBT, supra note 73, at 38 (discussing students’ lack of knowledge
regarding how their credit reports can negatively impact their employment and
lending opportunities).
150. See Block, Credit Card Use Plunges, supra note 15 (discussing consumers’
preferences for debit cards rather than credit cards); Brian Burnsed, New Rules
Place Barriers Between Students, Credit Card Issuers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 19,
2010, available at 2010 WLNR 3720727 (“The burgeoning popularity of debit cards
has caused credit card use to slide, though a healthy portion of students still opt to
carry [a credit card].”); Kimberly Palmer, The Rise of the Debit Card: Credit Balances
Dip, but Loan Debt Is Growing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 28, 2008, at 58, available at 2008 WLNR 1048321 (suggesting that debit cards may be replacing credit
cards on campuses); Ronald J. Mann, What Is Changing? Age, Economic Crisis, and
Shifting Patterns of Card Use, PYMNTS.COM, http://www.pymnts.com/what-is-changing-age-economic-crises-and-shifting-patterns-of-card-use-2/ (last visited Nov. 10,
2010) [hereinafter Mann, What Is Changing?] (reporting data indicating that more
consumers under age of thirty-five are debit users rather than credit card holders).
But see generally Katherine Porter, The Debt Dilemma, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1167, 1171
(2008) (reviewing RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS (2006)) (noting that “[d]ebit cards . . . are growing, but have not yet eclipsed the popularity of the credit card in America”).
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with banks to make student ID cards available as a debit card.151 It could
also reflect “a generational shift” in that young consumers may “‘have an
inherent preference for real-time payment methods like debit.’”152 As observed by Ronald Mann:
The rapidly accelerating shift to debit card use in the last 24
months, for example, suggests a shift away from borrowing-based
consumption, a shift that would have a much greater effect on
the credit card product than anything Congress is contemplating. This is particularly true if that trend is truly age-based—so
that it becomes ever harder to identify young and middle-aged
households that will use cards as a routine transaction and borrowing vehicle.153
Both Professor Mann and banking industry representatives acknowledge that it is too soon to determine if this trend will amount to a permanent shift away from credit cards and towards debit cards, or if the current
preference for debit cards is simply a reaction to the economic recession
such that consumers will revert back to using credit cards once the economy recovers.154 These uncertainties coupled with college-aged consumers’ continued use of credit cards155 necessitate the consideration of
measures that can help protect their financial futures. To that end, Congress incorporated specific provisions concerning college-aged consumers
in the recently enacted Credit CARD Act. The next part questions
whether these provisions will be effective in protecting this important
group of consumers.
IV. THE CREDIT CARD ACT: AN EMPTY PROMISE?
Signed into law by President Barack Obama on May 22, 2009, the
Credit CARD Act is considered “the most significant credit card reform
legislation” in over four decades.156 Amid concerns regarding the economic recession and recovery efforts, both the President and lawmakers
151. See David Migoya, Colorado Colleges Cash in Big on Credit Deals, DENVER
POST, Sept. 19, 2010, http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_16114567?source=
rss.
152. Block, Credit Card Use Plunges, supra note 15.
153. Mann, Credit Card Reform, supra note 15, at 3.
154. See Block, Credit Card Use Plunges, supra note 15; Mann, What is Changing?,
supra note 150.
155. See supra Part III.A.
156. Adam Levitin, Credit Card Legislation, CREDIT SLIPS BLOG (May 19, 2009,
8:13 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2009/05/credit-card-legislation.
html [hereinafter Levitin, Legislation] (referencing Truth in Lending Act, enacted
in 1968, as previous credit card reform legislation); see also Adam Levitin, The Credit
C.A.R.D Act: Opportunities and Challenges for Credit Unions 1 (Georgetown Law and
Economics Research Paper No. 10-09, 2010) [hereinafter Levitin, Credit Union Report], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1544885 (describing Credit CARD Act
as “the most significant piece of credit card legislation in a generation”).
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consider the Act to be an integral component of comprehensive financial
reform intended to better protect consumers.157 With goals to end unfair
and deceptive practices and to improve consumer disclosures, the Act includes new rules regarding interest rate increases,158 allocation and timing
of payments,159 and periodic statement disclosures.160 Pertinent to this
Article are the Act’s provisions concerning college-aged consumers.161
As discussed below, the Credit CARD Act seeks to protect young consumers by restricting access to those potential cardholders who do not
have the financial means with which to repay their debt. In theory, this is
a sound approach because it allows young, creditworthy consumers, many
of whom prove to be responsible cardholders, to obtain credit while
preventing those who do not have adequate means to repay their debt
from obtaining a credit card. However, due to the broad latitude afforded
issuers by the new rules and regulations, it is doubtful that this approach
will significantly reduce the number of non-creditworthy, college-aged
cardholders or curtail their credit card usage. Therefore, as proposed in
Part V, additional legislation and regulations are needed both to reduce
the number of young consumers who are permitted to obtain a card without the financial means to repay the debt and to diminish the negative
long-term consequences that many young cardholders suffer as a result of
amassing significant credit card debt.
In its efforts to stem young consumers’ credit card indebtedness, Congress passed legislation that seeks to curtail the number of young consumers who obtain credit cards and the amount of debt that they incur.162
The Credit CARD Act includes three primary provisions aimed at reducing
credit card indebtedness for college-aged consumers.163 First, effective
157. See 155 CONG. REC. S5314, S5316 (daily ed. May 11, 2009) (statement of
Sen. Christopher Dodd) [hereinafter Senator Dodd Statement]; Presidential Statement on the Implementation of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and
Disclosure Act of 2009, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOCS. No. 00115 (Feb. 22, 2010).
158. Credit CARD Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 101(b), 123 Stat. 1734, 1736-37
(codified in sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666j, i-1).
159. Id. §§ 102(a), 106(a)-(b).
160. Id. § 201(a).
161. The college-aged consumer protection provisions are found in Title III
of the Credit CARD Act entitled “Protection of Young Consumers.” See id. §§ 30105.
162. See Senator Dodd Statement, supra note 157, at S5316 (stating that Act
seeks to end deceptive card practices aimed at young people and protect them
from “onslaught of credit card offers, often years before they turn 18, usually as
soon as they set foot onto a college campus”); see also 155 CONG. REC. H5013,
H5020 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep. Louise Slaughter) [hereinafter
Representative Slaughter Statement] (discussing her support of measures “to protect college students from the hardship of excessive credit card debt and
bankruptcy”).
163. Although the Senate bill contained a provision permitting consumers
under the age of twenty-one to obtain a card if they complete an approved financial literacy course, the final version of the Act omitted this provision. See S. REP.
NO. 111-16, at 12 (2009); see also Hinson, supra note 27, at 303 (discussing earlier
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February 22, 2010, consumers under the age of twenty-one are not permitted to obtain a credit card unless their application includes the following:
(1) the signature of a cosigner who is at least twenty-one years old; or (2)
financial information indicating that they have independent means of paying the bill.164 In addition, card issuers are no longer permitted to send
prescreened credit offers to consumers under the age of twenty-one unless
the consumer has previously consented to receiving such offers.165 Finally, card issuers and creditors that engage in solicitation on or near a
university campus or at a university-sponsored or related event are now
banned from offering college students “free” gifts as inducements to complete a credit card application.166 At first glance, one would think that
these measures could indeed keep credit cards out of the hands of many
young consumers and, thereby, inhibit their ability to rack up thousands
of dollars in credit card debt. However, upon further inquiry, it becomes
apparent that several existing factors will hinder the Credit CARD Act’s
promise of young consumer protection from being fulfilled—the most disconcerting of which being the Act’s rules and regulations themselves.
Because the Credit CARD Act permits college-aged consumers with
independent means of paying their bill to obtain a card without a cosigner, it leaves the door open for young consumers to continue amassing
large amounts of credit card debt. The likelihood that this will occur is
particularly great when one considers the Federal Reserve Board’s newly
promulgated regulations that accompany the Act.167
Consider, for instance, the regulations concerning a card applicant’s
ability to pay. While the Act and regulations both require card issuers to
verify that all consumers, including college-aged consumers, have the ability to pay before issuing them a card,168 this requirement only applies to
prospective cardholders’ ability to pay “required minimum periodic payments under the terms of the account.”169 Thus, the issuer is not required
to ensure that a consumer has the ability to pay the entire credit amount
that will be made available to him or her under the credit card agreement.
Rather, the issuer is only required to ensure that the consumer has the
ability to pay the minimum monthly amount due.170 The regulations do
version of House bill that included underwriting requirements for student
consumers).
164. Credit CARD Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 301.
165. Id. § 302.
166. Id. § 304.
167. See generally Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 75 Fed. Reg. 7658 (Feb.
22, 2010) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). With regard to the provisions discussed
in this Article, the Board’s final rules were, in most respects, the same as those
proposed. Compare id. (final rule), with Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 74 Fed.
Reg. 54124 (proposed Oct. 21, 2009).
168. Credit CARD Act § 109; Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.51 (2011).
169. 12 C.F.R. § 226.51(a)(1)(i).
170. See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 75 Fed. Reg. at 7660.

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\56-1\VLR101.txt

2011]

FROM

THE

unknown

SCHOOLHOUSE

TO THE

Seq: 27

15-AUG-11

POORHOUSE

12:33

27

require card issuers to assume “utilization . . . of the full credit line that
the issuer is considering offering to the consumer”171 when “estimating
the minimum periodic payments the consumer would be required to
pay.”172 However, depending on the amount of the credit line and the
minimum payment formula employed by the issuer,173 this required payment amount could be as low as $25 to $50 per month.174 With such a low
payment threshold, it appears that card issuers can easily comply with the
Act’s ability to pay rules and regulations by endeavoring to qualify collegeaged consumers who have independent financial means to pay these low
amounts. As demonstrated below, credit card issuers will likely accomplish
this undertaking with ease due to the wide latitude granted to them by the
Board’s regulations concerning issuers’ verification (or lack thereof) of
young consumers’ independent ability to pay.
As previously mentioned, consumers under the age of twenty-one can
obtain a credit card without a cosigner if they can show that they have
independent financial resources with which to make their minimum periodic payments.175 According to the Board’s official staff interpretations,
both current resources as well as “reasonably expected”176 resources can be
considered in establishing a college-aged consumer’s independent ability
to pay. “For example, a card issuer may use information about current or
expected salary, wages, bonus pay, tips, and commissions. Employment
may be full-time, part-time, seasonal, [or] irregular. . . .”177 In addition,
card issuers are permitted to consider consumers’ “assets or income,”
which includes savings accounts, to establish their ability to pay.178
Take, for instance, an eighteen-year-old incoming college freshman
who is interested in obtaining a credit card. According to the regulations,
this individual can submit the tips and wages he or she expects to earn
while working as a server in a restaurant during holiday break to substantiate an independent ability to pay the low minimum monthly payments.
According to the regulations, it does not matter that he or she will not
actually receive this income for approximately four months because expected wages and tips from seasonal work qualifies as evidence of indepen171. 12 C.F.R. § 226.51(a)(2)(ii)(A).
172. 12 C.F.R. § 226.51(a)(2)(i).
173. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.51(a)(2)(ii)(B); see also Kristin Arnold, Calculating
Your Minimum Payment, BANKRATE.COM (May 3, 2005), http://www.bankrate.com/
brm/news/debt/20050503b1.asp (reporting that although it varies by issuer, consumer’s minimum payment is commonly two to four percent of card balance).
174. For an exercise in calculating monthly minimum payments, see BANKRATE.COM, Credit Card Calculator, http://www.bankrate.com/calculators/managing-debt/minimum-payment-calculator.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
175. See Credit CARD Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 301, 123 Stat. 1734, 1747-48
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)); 12 C.F.R. § 226.51(b)(1)(i).
176. Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 75 Fed. Reg. 7658, 7900 (Feb. 22,
2010) (emphasis added).
177. Id.
178. Id. (emphasis added).
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dent means to pay. Moreover, if this incoming student takes out student
loans to fund his or her educational expenses, these loans can be treated
as “income” to independently qualify for a card—a disconcerting practice
that some student consumers have already begun to implement.179 This
student can also place loan disbursement money into a savings account
and use it to independently qualify for a card because the account could
be considered an “asset” under current regulations.
Student loan refund accounts themselves may be deemed a permissible asset in light of the emerging practice of colleges and universities
partnering with companies to distribute student loan refund cards.180
Such cards, which take the place of traditional refund checks, essentially
operate as debit cards except that purchases and withdrawals are deducted
from students’ loan refund accounts rather than their checking or savings
accounts.181 Although touted by university officials as both an administrative cost- and time-saving measure as well as a way to generate income in
difficult economic times, many students and consumer advocates complain about the fees associated with the cards, which are not currently regulated under the Credit CARD Act.182
Perhaps even more disturbing than these potential assets on which
issuers can rely to qualify college-aged consumers is the fact that young
consumers can merely state on their credit card application that they have
(or expect to have) these financial resources, and the regulations do not
require card issuers to independently verify the truthfulness or accuracy of
such statements.183 Effectively, the regulations create a “stated” income
and assets regime similar to that employed in the subprime housing market—a regime that not only invites and facilitates fraudulent financial representations but also results in consumers obtaining credit and debt that
they cannot afford to repay.184 In the housing context, this practice of
179. In his survey of undergraduate students, Professor Hawkins found that
thirty percent of college-aged students who obtained a credit card since the beginning of the fall 2010 semester reported using student loan proceeds as income for
card qualification purposes. See Hawkins, supra note 86; see also, e.g., Susan
Tompor, Credit Card Offers Still Contain Trouble Spots for Consumers, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Sept. 30, 2010, http://www.freep.com/article/20100930/COL07/9300471/
Credit-card-offers-still-contain-trouble-spots-for-consumers.
180. See Ylan Q. Mui, Debit Cards Replacing Credit Cards on College Campuses,
WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/03/AR2010100304352.html.
181. See id.
182. See id. (“[S]tudents say several of the fees associated with Higher One’s
card are particularly irksome, including the $19 inactivity fee, a 50-cent charge for
using a PIN to make a purchase rather than a signature, and a $2.50 fee for using
other banks’ ATMs.”).
183. See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 75 Fed. Reg. at 7722 (discussing
reactions to Board’s rules regarding issuers’ ability to simply rely on income and
asset information stated on applicant’s application without independently verifying
information).
184. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Over-Indebtedness, the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,
and the Effect on U.S. Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 395, 400-03 (2009) (stating that
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deceptive and irresponsible lending not only caused grave consequences
for thousands of consumers but also contributed to the “mortgage
meltdown” and global financial crisis.185 Young consumers may experience similar negative consequences, such as delinquencies and bankruptcies, if credit card issuers are permitted to engage in this same sort of
imprudent and exploitative lending behavior.
One would think that Congress surely intended stricter requirements
than these when attempting to protect young consumers and to restrict
creditors’ abilities to issue credit cards to those who cannot afford to repay
the debt.186 As recognized by Senator Christopher Dodd:
Just as we saw in the mortgage crisis with lenders and borrowers,
too often issuers offer cards to young people without verifying
any ability to repay whatsoever. This is particularly true for students. . . . It is time to insist that credit card companies take into
account a young person’s ability to repay before allowing them to
take on what is all too often a lifetime worth of debt. Very little
we do in our legislation will be more important than these
provisions.187
Unfortunately, the Board does not appear to share this intention. As
acknowledged in the regulations, the Board clearly rejected consumer advocates’ recommendations that it “require a more stringent evaluation of a
“some borrowers intentionally inflated their incomes on liar loan [applications]”
resulting in outright fraud); Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and
Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 41 (2009) (stating that
“stated” income loans, also known as liar loans, are “the most common form of
mortgage fraud” because of opportunity to lie about one’s income on application);
see also Alan M. White, The Case for Banning Subprime Mortgages, 77 U. CIN. L. REV.
617, 634 (2008). As noted by Professor White:
The prevalence of “no-doc” loans, i.e., subprime mortgages made without
requiring any written verification of borrower income or assets, fostered a
climate in which borrower’s income, assets, and property value were routinely falsified. No-doc or “liar loans” reached a level of $276 billion in
2006, accounting for 46% of all subprime mortgages.
Id. at 634 (footnote omitted).
185. See Dickerson, supra note 184, at 412 (detailing evidence of housing crisis
that was precipitated, in part, by unscrupulous and predatory lending); David Anderson & Sarah Hodges, Credit Crisis Litigation: An Overview of Issues and Outcomes,
28 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. (June 2009) (“The subprime mortgage crisis that began in the summer of 2007 has exploded into a global financial crisis
more severe than anything seen in the past 70 years.”); Tami Luhby, Senate Votes to
Ban Liar Loans, CNNMONEY.COM (May 13, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/
05/13/news/economy/senate_mortgage_rules/index.htm?section=money_realestate (stating that Senate banned controversial liar loans that brought down housing market).
186. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. See generally Representative
Slaughter Statement, supra note 162, at H5020 (discussing lawmakers’ efforts to
“ensure that credit card companies cannot provide students with extravagant limits
and require the creditors to obtain a proof of income, income history and credit
history from the students before approving the application”).
187. Senator Dodd Statement, supra note 157, at S5316.
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consumer’s ability to make the required payments for consumers under
the age of 21 than the one required” generally for all consumers.188 According to the Board:
[C]onsumer group commenters suggested, for example, that
card issuers be required to only consider income earned from
wages or require a higher residual income or lower debt-to-income ratio for consumers less than 21 years old. A state regulatory agency commenter suggested that the Board require card
issuers to verify income or asset information stated on an application submitted by a consumer under the age of 21. The Board
declines to make the suggested changes. The Board believes that the
heightened procedures already set forth in [the Truth in Lending Act]. . . , as adopted by the Board . . . , will provide sufficient
protection for consumers less than 21 years old without unnecessarily impinging on their ability to obtain credit and build a
credit history.189
Considering the low threshold that card companies must meet to continue
issuing cards to young consumers, it is doubtful that the Board’s beliefs
will be realized, especially when one considers the credit card industry’s
strategic ability to adjust their practices to accomplish their economic
goals.
As recognized by Adam Levitin, “[t]he card industry has shown that it
is quite skilled at adaptation, and economic theory tells us that regulation
has a hydraulic effect—if practice A is banned, the market will simply
move to practice B.”190 As evidenced by a recent report issued by the Pew
Health Group, this effect is exactly what has happened since the enactment of the Credit CARD Act.191 While banks have eliminated troubling
practices such as the imposition of over-the-limit fees without consumers’
consent and unfair payment allocation, some have also increased
188. Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 75 Fed. Reg. at 7722.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Levitin, Legislation, supra note 156; see also Levitin, Credit Union Report,
supra note 156, at 12 (noting that when new legislation limits “tricks and traps”
relied upon by large bank issuers, it also “incentivize[s] large issuers to come up
with new ones”); Todd Wallack, Credit Card Firms Raise Fees Before Law Changes, BOSTON GLOBE, July 27, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/business/personal
finance/articles/2009/07/27/credit_card_firms_raise_fees_before_law_changes/
(discussing card companies’ practices of increasing rates and fees in response to
passing of Credit CARD Act).
191. See PEW HEALTH GROUP, TWO STEPS FORWARD: AFTER THE CREDIT CARD
ACT, CREDIT CARDS ARE SAFER AND MORE TRANSPARENT—BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN
1-2 (2010) [hereinafter PEW HEALTH GROUP], available at http://www.pewtrusts.
org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Credit_Cards/PEW-CreditCard%
20FINAL.pdf?n=1231; Sudeep Reddy, Card Issuers’ Novel Ways Outflank Law, WALL
ST. J., June 3, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB100014240527
48704515704575282890099634622.html (discussing banks’ new tactics to raise interest rates and charge credit card fees in wake of Credit CARD Act).
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surcharges for cash advances and stopped disclosing the size of penalty
interest rates.192
Interestingly, with respect to the Credit CARD Act’s provisions related
to young consumers, the report found that out of its entire survey of over
450 card-issuing banks and credit unions,193 only one “mentioned special
provisions for young people, indicating that a co-signer would be required
if the applicant was under age 21. These new protections have not been
widely reflected in card issuers’ terms and conditions.”194 This finding
begs the question: Why are issuers seemingly paying such little attention to
these “protections”? Perhaps, they have been preoccupied with complying
with other provisions of the Act. It may also be possible that the current
legislation and regulations are not likely to have a significant impact on
the way issuers currently do business with college-aged consumers.
Prior to the Board’s promulgation of final regulations, some industry
representatives speculated that issuing cards to college-aged consumers
would be so burdensome and costly that some banks may decide to stop
extending credit to this class of consumers.195 It does not appear that this
will be the case.196 Card issuers are aware of the lenient regulations related to establishing young consumers’ independent ability to make periodic payments; they know that they are permitted to simply rely on the
financial information submitted by young consumers on their card applications.197 In fact, the regulations state that “[i]ndustry commenters were
supportive of the Board’s approach”198 regarding this matter.
While some issuers such as Discover state “that full-time students
under age 21 will need to show verifiable income that’s above $2,000 a
year and must have ‘an acceptable debt-to-income ratio’ to qualify for the
Discover Student card,”199 credit card companies have routinely customized or waived underwriting standards for students in attempts to increase
their number of student cardholders.200 Considering the current and fu192. PEW HEALTH GROUP, supra note 191, at 1-2.
193. See id. at 1.
194. Id. at 20.
195. See Maria Aspan, Final Semester for Credit Cards Aimed at Students?, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 25, 2009, at 1.
196. For example, Citibank currently offers six college student credit cards,
three of which are advertised as “no cosigner needed.” See CITIBANK, All Student
Credit Cards, https://creditcards.citi.com/credit-cards/all-student-credit-cards/
(last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
197. See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 75 Fed. Reg. 7658, 7722 (Feb. 22,
2010).
198. Id.
199. AnnaMaria Andriotis, Credit-Card Issuers’ New College Strategies, WALL ST. J.
CLASSROOM ED., May 2010, http://wsjclassroom.com/cre/articles/10may_colm_
creditcard.htm [hereinafter Andriotis, Strategies].
200. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 34 (reporting that, according to one
issuer, location where students attend college is more important to approving application than whether or not they are employed); Hinson, supra note 27, at 290
(“Student applicants on college campuses are generally not required to meet in-
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ture profitability of this segment of the market,201 it is doubtful that credit
card companies will end these customization practices, which appear allowable under the Act. Therefore, creditors will most likely continue issuing cards to consumers under the age of twenty-one who do not possess
the financial means to repay their debt and, in so doing, continue to facilitate the escalating problem of young consumer indebtedness.
One final factor that may hinder the effectiveness of the Credit CARD
Act in protecting young consumers is the Act’s allowance of college-aged
consumers to obtain a card if they are able to secure a cosigner who is at
least twenty-one years old.202 Ideally, the cosigner would be someone such
as a parent or guardian who has the knowledge and experience to fully
understand and appreciate the financial liabilities associated with being a
cosigner. Indeed, issuers have already begun marketing to parents in their
attempts to attract student consumers.203 However, since any qualifying
adult who is age twenty-one or older can cosign on the application for
college-aged consumers, older students, who may already have student
loan and/or credit card debt, are permitted to cosign if they meet the
issuers’ requirements. There have already been reports of some college
students paying older students and friends to serve as cosigners.204 Therefore, the Act paves the way for increasing the indebtedness of not only
college-aged consumers but also of their cosigning parents, guardians,
friends, and relatives.
Despite its efforts to restrict the issuance of cards to young consumers
who do not have adequate financial resources with which to repay the
debt, it is doubtful that the Credit CARD Act will significantly impact the
number of young cardholders or the amount of debt that they amass. In
view of these factors, more comprehensive legislation is needed to diminish the negative long-term effects that credit card debt can have on the
lives and futures of many young consumers.205
come standards and background checks that would otherwise be required.”); MacDonald, supra note 89 (discussing issuers’ tendency to “waive the normal
underwriting criteria for students” in attempts to establish brand loyalty by being
one of first cards that students obtain (internal quotation marks omitted)).
201. See supra Part II.A.
202. Credit CARD Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 301, 123 Stat. 1734, 1747-48
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)).
203. See Andriotis, Strategies, supra note 199 (discussing issuers’ use of direct
mail to parents’ homes to market student credit cards).
204. See College Students Skirt Rules to Get Credit Cards, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Sept.
24, 2010), http://www.pri.org/business/economic-security/college-students-skirtrules-to-get-credit-cards2166.html; see also David Migoya, More College Students Duck
Credit Card Law, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 20, 2010, at 20; Tompor, supra note 179.
205. See Hinson, supra note 27, at 302 (stating that Credit CARD Act does not
fully protect young consumers because once credit card is issued, they can still
amass large amounts of debt for which they do not have income or financial means
to pay).
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PROTECTING OUR YOUTH—PRESERVING THEIR FUTURES

As previously discussed in Part III of this Article, credit card usage by
college-aged consumers has increased significantly over the past several
years resulting in detrimental academic, financial, and personal consequences for several young cardholders.206 Congress has recognized the
significance of this problem; however, its recent attempts to address it may
very well prove futile.207 Not only does the Credit CARD Act provide
methods by which card companies can continue to issue cards to collegeaged consumers who may not be able to repay their debt, but it also fails to
include provisions that can provide protection for young consumers once
they receive and begin to use their cards.208 Consequently, additional
measures are needed to more effectively protect young consumers’ personal and financial futures.
This Part discusses several additional provisions that could be implemented to provide greater protection for college-aged consumers. Inherent in the suggestion and consideration of any proposal are inevitable
normative questions related generally to credit availability and debt accumulation and, specifically, to young consumer indebtedness. Policymakers, lawmakers, and scholars can and often do disagree on how best to
approach and resolve these complex issues.209 Even among those policymakers who may agree that college-aged consumers need greater protections than those currently provided in the Act, they would surely have
differing opinions regarding various aspects of such protections, such as
the appropriate time period for providing such protections. Three options, which are not mutually exclusive, include the following time periods: (1) before young consumers obtain a card; (2) during the time in
which they are using their card; or (3) at the time when they default on
their card agreement. In addition, policymakers may have divergent
thoughts regarding what the goals of additional measures should be.
Again, non-mutually exclusive options include: (1) decreasing the number
of college-aged cardholders; (2) decreasing the amount of credit card
debt young consumers incur; or (3) decreasing the literal and figurative
206. See supra Part III; see also SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 3 (reporting
that “[n]early every indicator measured in spring 2008 showed an increase in
credit card usage [by college students] since the last study was conducted in fall
2004”).
207. See supra Part IV.
208. See Hinson, supra note 27, at 303-04 (critiquing Credit CARD Act’s lack
of protective provisions for college-aged consumers once they obtain cards, such as
limits on amount of credit and number of cards young consumers can obtain).
209. See, e.g., Steven W. Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usury and
Unconscionability: The Case for Regulating Abusive Commercial and Consumer Interest
Rates Under the Unconscionability Standard, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 721, 728-32 (1994)
(summarizing views held by proponents and opponents of usury interest rate
caps); Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics of the American Family, 12 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 1, 38-40 (2004) (advocating for interest rate credit regulation).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\56-1\VLR101.txt

34

unknown

Seq: 34

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

15-AUG-11

12:33

[Vol. 56: p. 1

“costs” that young cardholders must pay as a consequence of incurring
debt.
Because of these various possibilities, this Article suggests a spectrum
of proposals ranging from those that would further restrict young consumers’ access to credit cards and, thereby, reduce the number of college-aged
cardholders, to those that would provide protections after young consumers begin to use their cards. Obviously, there are costs and benefits associated with each proposal that would have to be carefully considered before
adoption. However, given the possibility that the Credit CARD Act’s current provisions may fail to significantly impact young consumers’ credit
card indebtedness, policymakers should earnestly consider these and
other measures if they hope to provide meaningful and effective protections for college-aged consumers.
A.

Raising the Bar to Borrow

As evidenced by the enactment of the young consumer provisions included in the Credit Card Act,210 lawmakers have been deeply concerned
with the growth in the number of young cardholders and the amount of
debt they have amassed.211 Assuming that the Act’s current provisions are
not likely to effectively curtail these occurrences212 and that the growth in
young consumer indebtedness warrants curtailment, policymakers should
implement new ways by which to restrict non-creditworthy, college-aged
consumers’ access to credit cards. Such measures could impose stricter
underwriting requirements such as an age restriction or employment requirement, or they could require issuers to independently verify the financial resources information included on young consumers’ applications.
Depending on the goals policymakers sought to accomplish, one or more
of these proposals could be effective.
1.

Increased Age Restriction

If policymakers wish to significantly decrease the number of collegeaged cardholders, the most effective way to achieve this goal would be to
prohibit them from independently obtaining a card until they reach the
age of twenty-one.213 Despite the potential effectiveness of this proposal,
it is likely not a feasible proposition for several reasons. First, in most
states, the age of majority for entering into contracts is eighteen.214
Therefore, requiring consumers to be twenty-one to enter into a credit
210. Credit CARD Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, §§ 301-05, 123 Stat. 1734, 1747-51
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
211. See supra note 162.
212. See supra Part IV.
213. See, e.g., Wayne Jekot, Note, Over the Limit: The Case for Increased Regulation
of Credit Cards for College Students, 5 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 109, 125 (2005) (proposing
that “credit card issuers should be prohibited from granting credit to those under
twenty-one who are full-time college students”).
214. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.3, at 221-22 (4th ed. 2004).
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card agreement would contradict this established rule.215 If Congress felt
that young consumers’ escalated credit card debt warrants the age restriction, then it could utilize its authority under the Spending Clause to effectuate an age increase.216 Just as it did to implement an increase in the
drinking age, Congress could condition the receipt of federal funds to
states’ agreement to increase the age for obtaining a credit card to twentyone.217 It is doubtful, however, that there would be sufficient political will
to invoke this authority.
Many lawmakers would likely oppose requiring young consumers to
be twenty-one before obtaining a card because of their concerns that doing so would infringe upon adults’ freedom to obtain needed and beneficial credit.218 As argued by Representative Jeb Hensarling, “[w]e’re
talking about folks over 18 who can vote, who can go to war, in most States
can marry, own real property. We shouldn’t be paternalistic towards
them. We shouldn’t deny them what could be an incredibly valuable tool
to get them through college in the first place.”219
Indeed, college officials and industry representatives have acknowledged the benefits of credit cards for many students. Such advantages
include accessibility to financial resources in the event of an emergency,
ability to pay for education-related expenses, and the opportunity to establish and build credit history.220 Those who would oppose an age restric215. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 258-59.
216. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
217. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07, 210-13 (1987) (holding
that Congress is permitted to condition states’ receipt of federal highway funds to
their enactment of minimum drinking age); Scott R. Simpson, Comment, Report
Card: Grading the Country’s Response to Columbine, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 415, 425 (2005)
(“Congress could not impose a national drinking age on the States, but it could do
indirectly what it could not do directly using its Commerce Clause powers.”).
218. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (noting Board’s concerns of
“unnecessarily impinging on [college-aged consumers’] ability to obtain credit”);
see also 155 CONG. REC. H5013, H5020 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep.
Spencer Bachus) (expressing concern that some proposed amendments to Credit
Cardholders’ Bill of Rights Act of 2009 would “result in students not having the use
of a credit card”); Hinson, supra note 27, at 304, 306 (discussing industry representative’s concerns that “the ‘creation of barriers to credit access’ would impose
greater hardships on those who rely on credit for both day-to-day and emergency
expenses”) (footnote and citation omitted); Jessica Dickler, Credit Card Debt on
Campus, CNNMONEY.COM (July 14, 2008), http://money.cnn.com/2008/07/10/
pf/credit_cards_college/?postversion=2008071413 (reporting banking industry
representative’s views that “credit cards are a valuable tool for students” and that
lawmakers should therefore “exercise caution” when considering “legislative proposals that would limit or prevent certain students from obtaining credit cards”).
219. 155 CONG. REC. H5013, H5021 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of
Rep. Jeb Hensarling).
220. See supra note 76 and accompanying text; see also GAO REPORT, supra
note 35, at 8-9; Hinson, supra note 27, at 289. Similar arguments have been made
to support the claim that low-income consumers should have increased access to
credit cards. See Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451, 457-60 (2008).
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tion could argue that prohibiting consumers under the age of twenty-one
from obtaining a credit card would prevent them from obtaining these
benefits.
It could also be argued that denying or restricting young consumers’
access to credit cards would deprive them of the benefit of learning how to
responsibly manage credit.221 Recent studies show that young consumers
make costly financial mistakes (i.e., exceeding their credit limit and paying
bills late) due, in part, to their inexperience and lack of financial knowledge.222 The adverse impact that lack of financial experience has on consumers’ credit card behaviors is confirmed by recent research finding that
new cardholders pay a greater number of late payment, over-the-limit, and
cash advance fees than do consumers who have had their cards for longer
periods of time.223 These findings suggest that over time and after encountering negative borrowing experiences, consumers learn to avoid
making costly mistakes such as going over their limit or making late payments.224 If learning is “driven by feedback,” as concluded in the study,225
then restricting young consumers’ ability to obtain cards would arguably
deny them opportunities to experience card use and learn from the financial mistakes that can accompany such use. Perhaps the optimal time for
consumers to make and learn from these mistakes is during their collegeaged years so that they are better equipped to manage credit and debt
when they get older.
Imposing an age restriction, however, would not necessarily prevent
young consumers from learning how to manage credit and debt or from
enjoying any of the other benefits mentioned above. They could do so by
221. See GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 9 (noting that some student cardholders’ parents view credit cards as “tool for learning financial responsibility”); Barbara Bedway, Credit Card Issuers’ Last Stab at Hooking Your Kid, CBS MONEYWATCH.
COM (Sept. 10, 2009), http://moneywatch.bnet.com/saving-money/article/college-kids-and-credit-cards-what-every-parent-needs-to-know/340021/ (stating that
some financial experts believe that having credit cards can help “a young adult
learn how to manage credit responsibly, build a credit history, and provide peace
of mind to his parents in an emergency”); Burnsed, supra note 150 (“Credit cards
are the simplest way for students to build strong credit before they’re thrust into
the real world.”); Connie Prater, Law May Force Parents, Children to Talk About Credit
Cards, CREDITCARD.COM (July 8, 2009), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-cardnews/credit-card-law-college-students-parents-1282.php (stating that limiting college students’ access to credit will result in hindering or delaying young adults
building credit history in their names).
222. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
223. See Sumit Agarwal et al., Learning in the Credit Card Market 3, 6-9 (2008)
[hereinafter Agarwal et al., Learning], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1091623&download=yes (finding that “fee payments are
fairly common when accounts are initially opened, but that the frequency of fee
payments declines rapidly as account tenure increases”). For further discussion of
research indicating that the majority of financial penalty fees are paid by inexperienced young consumers or less intelligent older persons, see supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
224. See Agarwal et al., Learning, supra note 223, at 3, 6-9.
225. See id. at 3.
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obtaining a card with a cosigner or by becoming an authorized user on
someone’s account, such as a parent.226 In addition, it is important to
recognize that these financial lessons are extremely costly to young consumers not only in the short-term with the payment of fees but also in the
long-term with the reporting of negative credit history on their credit reports for seven years.227 Considering the gravity of these costs, policymakers could attempt to prevent college-aged consumers from experiencing
them by imposing the age restriction.
As previously discussed, young consumers often experience detrimental consequences as a result of their credit card use, especially when they
incur debt without having the financial means by which to repay it.228 Arguably, a complete proscription to issuing cards to consumers under the
age of twenty-one would not be the optimal way to help young consumers
avoid these consequences because such a restriction could be viewed as
overinclusive. Although policymakers would be attempting to protect
those consumers who do not have the financial resources with which to
repay their debt, the increased age restriction would give no consideration
to a consumer’s ability to pay. Therefore, perhaps a more balanced approach would be to permit issuance of credit cards only to those collegeaged consumers who are currently employed and can verify that they have
sufficient income to repay their debt.
2.

Strengthened Ability-to-Pay Requirements

Similar to suggestions consumer advocates offered to the Board during the proposed rulemaking comment period for the Credit CARD
Act,229 legislation intended to protect college-aged consumers could require those consumers and issuers to comply with stricter underwriting
requirements.230 The spectrum of stricter standards could include a prerequisite that college-aged applicants verify that they have current income,
not “expected assets” as presently permitted by the regulations,231 if they
wish to obtain a credit card without a cosigner. Requiring young consumers to be employed before being eligible to obtain a credit card would
ensure that they are generating income and wages with which to pay their
debt. Although cardholders could quit their jobs after having their card
application approved, one would think they would be disinclined to do so,
especially after incurring charges on their card for which they are
responsible.
226. See Hinson, supra note 27, at 298 (discussing advantages of young consumers becoming authorized users on their parents’ credit card accounts).
227. See supra Part III. For a proposal to reduce the costs associated with the
reporting of young consumers’ negative credit card history, see infra Part V.B.3.
228. See supra Part III; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 9-14.
229. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
231. See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 75 Fed. Reg. 7658, 7900 (Feb. 22,
2010).
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Mandating an employment requirement could be viewed as good
public policy because it could teach young consumers (and remind the
card industry)232 that receiving a credit card should not be viewed as a
right to which all consumers become entitled merely by turning eighteen
years old. Rather, it should be looked upon as a serious financial undertaking reserved for those individuals with sufficient income to pay their
debt. Considering that research shows that students’ credit card use is
affected by their attitudes regarding the normalcy of debt in general and
credit card debt in particular,233 policymakers should attempt to implement proposals such as an employment requirement that can help to foster fiscally responsible attitudes.234
While this proposal would succeed in reducing the number of young
unemployed cardholders, it may also contribute to increases in young consumers’ debt levels once they become cardholders. A recent study examining credit card borrowing by college students found that “a student who
is currently employed is 29% more likely to borrow,” resulting in, “on average, $390 more in credit card debt[ ] than a student not currently working.”235 Therefore, policymakers would have to consider this potential
consequence when contemplating the viability of an employment requirement to accomplish their consumer protection goals.
The concerns discussed above regarding the imposition of overinclusive rules that prevent young consumers from enjoying the benefits of
credit also apply to this proposal. Implementing an employment requirement would prevent all unemployed consumers from independently obtaining a card, even if they possess adequate financial assets with which to
pay their debts. Arguably, this proposal is not as overinclusive as the age
restriction because employed consumers under the age of twenty-one
would be permitted to obtain cards. However, young consumers’ access to
credit cards is significantly reduced under this proposal, particularly for
those college-aged consumers who may have significant financial assets
due to their socioeconomic status. Such consumers would have to secure
a cosigner or become an authorized user on someone else’s card in order
to obtain a card and begin establishing their credit history. Policymakers
would have to weigh the potential benefits of prohibiting young unemployed consumers from obtaining credit cards against this and other possible costs.
Another proposal along the spectrum of heightened eligibility rules
would be requiring issuers to base ability-to-pay determinations on young
consumers’ ability to repay the entire amount of offered credit rather than
232. For further discussion of the credit card industry’s original reluctance to
lend to unemployed, young consumers, see supra Part I.A.
233. See Arano & Parker, supra note 94, at 1-2, 7.
234. Such attitudes could also be developed through financial literacy courses
and public service campaigns. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 268-76 (recommending mandatory financial education for college-aged consumers).
235. Arano & Parker, supra note 94, at 6.
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their ability to make minimum monthly payments, as currently permitted
by the Act and accompanying regulations.236 As previously discussed, the
current rules set forth a very low standard for issuers to independently
qualify young consumers.237 They appear to be premised on the assumption that young consumers will be “borrowers” making minimum monthly
payments238 rather than “convenience users” who pay their balances in
full each month.239 This assumption is correct for the majority of student
cardholders; however, young consumers’ borrowing causes them to pay
significant amounts of interest and contributes to their incurrence of
costly penalty fees.240 To prevent college-aged consumers from incurring
debt for which they can only afford to make minimum payments, policymakers could require issuers to ensure that young cardholders’ income
and assets (if one is unwilling to impose an employment requirement) are
sufficient to repay an amount equal to the amount of credit that will be
extended under the card agreement.
Perhaps the least objectionable approach to strengthening the current ability to pay requirements is to require card issuers to independently
verify applicants’ income and assets before issuing them a card.241 Issuers
could accomplish this by requiring applicants to provide copies of their
current paycheck, pay stub, and financial account statements when submitting their application. While there may be some administrative costs
associated with performing such verification, the benefits of ensuring that
applicants actually possess the financial resources on which they are relying to obtain a credit card could outweigh those costs. As previously discussed, permitting a “stated” income approach when issuing cards to
young consumers is an untenable proposition and invites the very deceptive behaviors that the Act is intended to eliminate.242 Therefore, policymakers should consider requiring issuers to independently verify collegeaged applicants’ current income and assets before issuing credit cards to
them.
236. See Credit CARD Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 109, 123 Stat. 1734, 1743
(codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1665e); Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.51 (2011).
237. See supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text.
238. See SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 10, at 130 (asserting that “credit cards make it far easier to incur consumer debt by encouraging alittle-at-a-time borrowing and too-little-at-a-time repayment”).
239. See supra note 57.
240. For a discussion of the correlation between payment histories, interest
rates, and penalty fees, see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text; see also Representative
Slaughter Statement, supra note 162, at H5019 (proposing income verification
amendment to Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights Act of 2009 stating that “a creditor shall require adequate proof of income, income history, and credit history,
subject to the rules of the Board, before any college student credit card account
may be opened by or on behalf of a student”).
242. See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
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Lowering the “Costs” of Borrowing

The proposals discussed thus far arguably would provide greater protections for young consumers by restricting their ability to incur debt they
cannot afford to repay. If implemented, the proposals would protect
young consumers prior to the issuance of a card. One of the other weaknesses of the Act is that it fails to provide adequate protections for young
cardholders post-issuance (i.e., once they receive and begin to use their
cards).243 Although the Act includes beneficial provisions that are generally applicable to all cardholders,244 it misses an important opportunity to
provide greater protections for college-aged consumers by reducing the
literal and figurative costs that many of them must pay as a consequence of
their credit card indebtedness. Three of these costs include: (1) higher
debt levels facilitated by unsolicited credit limit increase; (2) high interest
rates; and (3) inclusion of negative credit history in credit reports. Policymakers should consider implementing measures to help reduce these
costs which would, in turn, provide greater protection for college-aged
consumers’ personal and financial futures.
1.

Restricting Credit Limit Increases

One way to better protect young consumers from the pitfalls of credit
card debt is to prohibit issuers from increasing young cardholders’ credit
limits without their request or consent. Currently under the Act, consumers under the age of twenty-one who obtain a card with the assistance of a
cosigner are not permitted to have their credit limits increased unless the
cosigner provides written approval of the increase.245 This beneficial provision protects consumers against issuer-initiated credit limit increases
and, thereby, helps to reduce the amount of debt young consumers will
incur. Unfortunately, this provision does not apply to college-aged cardholders who independently qualify for a card. The approval provision’s
inapplicability to non-cosigner accounts may reflect Congress’s attempt to
protect young cardholders’ parents, many of whom provide financial assistance to repay their child’s credit card debt.246 However, considering the
ease with which card companies will likely be able to independently qualify
consumers247 and young consumers’ escalating indebtedness,248
243. See supra note 208.
244. See supra notes 21-22, 158-60 and accompanying text.
245. See Credit CARD Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 303, 123 Stat. 1734, 1748
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 1637).
246. See Senator Dodd Statement, supra note 157, at S5316 (noting that many
parents “ultimately” repay credit card debt their children incur); see also 155 CONG.
REC. S5488 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statement of Sen. Claire McCaskill) (asserting
that issuers “send these cards to kids because they know their parents, if they are in
college, don’t want them to get into trouble and they will bail them out if they get
in too deep”).
247. See supra Part IV.
248. See supra Part III.A.
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lawmakers should pass additional legislation to remedy this discrepancy
and extend the protections provided by this provision to all college-aged
consumers.
While it is true that cardholders who receive an unsolicited credit
limit increase could easily contact the issuer and request that the limit be
decreased to the original amount, for several reasons it is unlikely that
many young consumers will do this. First, they enjoy the perceived freedom and independence that credit gives them;249 therefore, they are unlikely to voluntarily seek to curb or restrict this freedom. Also, some enjoy
the perceived sense of status that having cards with high credit limits provides.250 They feel that with a higher limit they can afford to socialize with
and be accepted by individuals with higher financial and social stature,251
even if their reliance on credit and debt masks their true ability to do so.
Also, like many consumers, young cardholders can be affected by “a
combination of behavioral biases that results in the underestimation of
future borrowing.”252 As Oren Bar-Gill has recognized, consumers’ use of
credit cards can be affected by biases such as underestimation of self-control problems whereby “consumers overestimate their ability to resist the
temptation to finance consumption by borrowing”253 and optimism bias
whereby consumers “underestimate the likelihood that they will be forced
to resort to credit card borrowing.”254 These biases could contribute to
young consumers’ decision not to request a reduction in their credit limit
because they do not anticipate using the additional credit.
And if they do decide to borrow with the additional credit, many
young consumers expect that their future financial resources will enable
them to repay the debts they incurred during their young adulthood.255
In fact,
249. See MANNING, LIVING WITH DEBT, supra note 73, at 31 (discussing young
consumers’ association of “debt-based behaviors” with “assertions of adulthood/
independence, freedom, and market-based self worth/social status”); id. at 36 (attributing students’ use of cards to their “psychological need to satisfy cravings for
independence, self-esteem, and financial freedom”).
250. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 171 (recounting
student’s feelings after obtaining credit card: “ ‘It made me feel like I had made it
. . . people treated me differently when they saw [the Gold card].’ ”) (alteration in
original).
251. See id. at 171-72 (discussing student’s rationalization that having credit
card “befitted his status as a student at an elite, private university” and “alleviated
social-status anxiety” because of way his peers treated him when he used his card);
id. at 175 (discussing student’s use of cards to meet and fit in with “ ‘the right
people’ ”); see also MANNING, LIVING WITH DEBT, supra note 73, at 35 (discussing
students’ perceived need to spend in order to “ ‘keep up with everyone’ ”).
252. Bar-Gill, supra note 46, at 1375. For a detailed discussion of the underestimation of future borrowing behavioral theory and its impact on consumers’
credit card use, see id. at 1395-411.
253. Id. at 1395, 1395-400.
254. Id. at 1400.
255. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 171; MANNING, LIVING WITH DEBT, supra note 73, at 34; YARROW & O’DONNELL, supra note 73, at 67,
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[R]esearch suggests that consumers base their borrowing on current estimations of future likely ability to pay, and that consumer
estimates of future ability to pay are influenced by the credit limits banks bestow on them. Thus, consumers reason: “If a bank is
willing to loan me this much money, there must be good reason
to think that my salary will increase in the future sufficiently to
permit repayment.”256
Therefore, unsolicited credit limit increases assist young cardholders in
amassing large amounts of debt—some without awareness of the amount
of debt they are accumulating257 and others without contemplating the
future difficulties they may have repaying it.258
The credit card industry, which would likely oppose this proposal,
could argue that it unduly restricts their ability to build customer loyalty by
rewarding those customers who have responsibly maintained their accounts over an established period of time.259 They could also argue that
they are actually improving a consumer’s credit score by increasing their
credit limit. While this is true if the consumer can resist the temptation to
use the additional extension of credit,260 the reality for many consumers,
including young cardholders, is that the more credit they have the more
credit they will use.261 Arguably, issuers are aware of this behavior and
seek to facilitate it by increasing the credit limit for those cardholders who
are close to exceeding or have already exceeded their original credit
limit.262
73; Christine Dugas, ‘Generation Y’ Faces Some Steep Financial Hurdles, USA TODAY,
Apr. 23, 2010, at A1.
256. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 99, at 48-49.
257. See SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 12 (finding that sixty percent of
college students surveyed reported being frequently or sometimes surprised at how
high their credit card balances had reached).
258. See id.; MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 137-40.
259. See Bankrate.com, How that Huge Credit Limit Can Hurt You, MSN MONEY
(Oct. 27, 2010), http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/banking/creditcardsmarts/p71448.asp.
260. See Jessica Dickler, Credit: Know Your Limits, CNNMONEY.COM (Sept. 25,
2008), http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/25/pf/credit_limits/index.htm (discussing impact of consumers’ “debt-to-limit ratio” on calculation of their credit scores).
For further discussion of consumers’ attempts to control their credit usage as well
as their underestimation of their own self-control, see supra note 253 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., MANNING, LIVING WITH DEBT, supra note 73, at 36 (reporting that
“some students accumulate high levels of credit card debt within weeks and even
within days of receiving their line of credit”); Littwin, supra note 220, at 487 (discussing findings of two studies indicating that “consumers tend to maintain balances at a consistent percentage of their credit limit”).
262. See SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 10, at 115; Donna
S. Harkness, “Just Let Me Borrow Your Charge Card, Ma”: How the Enlightened Borrower
Paradigm and the Improvident Extension of Credit Facilitate Exploitation of the Elderly by
Those Nearest and Dearest to Them, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 367, 379 (2009).
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To avoid this from happening to young consumers, lawmakers should
require issuers to receive consent from all college-aged cardholders before
raising their credit limits. Similar to proposals recommended by Angela
Littwin in the context of low-income cardholders, “consumer-controlled
credit limits” could be very beneficial for reducing young consumers’
debt.263 With regards to credit limit increases, Littwin proposes various
ways in which proposals could be implemented, ranging from consumers
affirmatively requesting a credit limit increase by completing and returning a form that could be included with the monthly bill to issuers
sending “notifications of potential credit-limit raises” to which consumers
must affirmatively assent by returning an acceptance form.264 Obviously,
there are implementation costs associated with these and other proposals
that must be considered;265 however, Congress has already shown a willingness to impose such costs by requiring written cosigner approval for
limit increases on young consumer accounts.266 Therefore, such costs
should not deter lawmakers from extending those same protections to all
college-aged cardholders.
Arguably, requiring all young cardholders to request or consent to a
credit limit increase would be consistent with the current credit card issuance rules included in the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) that prohibit card
companies from issuing cards “except in response to a request or application therefor.”267 Admittedly, the cardholder agreement may grant the
issuer the authority to review the cardholder’s credit status and make
changes to the account accordingly; however, if the purpose of TILA’s issuance rules is to prevent issuers from unilaterally imposing credit and
debt upon uninformed, unsuspecting consumers,268 then this same purpose should be reflected in the Credit CARD Act’s provisions concerning
credit limit increases for all college-aged cardholders, including those who
have cosigners and those who do not.269
263. See Littwin, supra note 220, at 485-87. In the article, Professor Littwin
proposes an innovative model for a new credit card system that includes the use of
self-directed cards, which are those that “permit consumers to exercise more control over their credit-card usage by precommitting to certain levels and types of
credit-card spending and borrowing.” Id. at 479. For a more detailed discussion of
the proposed system, see id. at 478-501.
264. Id. at 485-86.
265. See id. at 486.
266. See Credit CARD Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 303, 123 Stat. 1734, 1748
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 1637).
267. Truth in Lending Act § 132, 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (2006).
268. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006). The relevant portion reads:
It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily
the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of
credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit
billing and credit card practices.
Id.
269. During the rulemaking comment period, consumer advocates recommended that credit card issuers not be permitted to increase any card limit without
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Capping Interest Rates

Another way policymakers could provide greater protection for young
consumers after they begin to use their cards is to impose interest rate
caps on college-aged consumers’ accounts.270 As previously discussed, the
vast majority of student cardholders incur interest on their credit card
debt, and their interest rates can be higher due to their lack of credit
history.271 Because interest represents a significant cost to young borrowers and increases the amount they have to repay using no or relatively little
income,272 imposing a relatively low interest rate limit on young consumers’ accounts would significantly reduce their cost of borrowing. Since the
vast majority of undergraduate cardholders (ninety-two percent) report
using credit cards for education-related expenses,273 lawmakers could
mandate that issuers of cards to college-aged consumers cap their interest
rates at the amount charged for Federal Direct Loans. The interest rates
for Direct Loans currently range from 4.5% to 7.9%,274 which is significantly less than the current average student card rate of 13.31%.275
Although lawmakers have been unwilling to establish a federal limit
for credit card interest rates, Congress has shown a willingness to provide
interest rate protections to certain groups of consumers who lawmakers
feel warrant heightened protection. Based, in part, on arguments made
by Steven Graves and Christopher Peterson regarding predatory lending
and military families,276 Congress imposed a thirty-six percent annual interest rate cap on certain types of consumer loans offered to military personnel and their families.277 Policymakers could attempt to make a
similar case with regards to college-aged consumers and credit card issuers
receiving a direct request to do so. See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 75 Fed.
Reg. 7658, 7720 (Feb. 22, 2010). However, the Board rejected this suggestion arguing that the Credit CARD Act’s ability-to-pay provision, which applies to issuance
and credit limit increases, is sufficient to protect against improper unilateral increases. See id.
270. For a discussion of the historical and current debate concerning interest
rate caps, see Bender, supra note 209 and Vincent D. Rougeau, Rediscovering Usury:
An Argument for Legal Controls on Credit Card Interest Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1
(1996).
271. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; see also Hinson, supra note 27,
at 291.
272. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
273. See SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 5, at 3, 11-12
274. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Direct Loan Information for Students, http://www.
direct.ed.gov/student.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2011).
275. See Credit Card Rate Report, CREDITCARDS.COM, http://www.creditcards.
com/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2011).
276. See Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the
Military: The Law and Geography of “Payday” Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J.
653 (2005).
277. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
(Talent Amendment), Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 670, 120 Stat. 2083, 2266-69 (amending 10 U.S.C. § 987).
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in efforts to limit the amount of interest charged on young consumer
accounts.
Like military service members, college-aged consumers are “young
people [who] often lack financial experience and tend to borrow with less
regard for the long-term consequences.”278 Issuers engage in aggressive
solicitation tactics to target college-aged consumers,279 and they set and
raise credit limits seemingly without regard to young consumers’ capacity
to repay the debt.280 As recognized by Representative Louise Slaughter,
“If credit card companies applied the same scrutiny to college students as
they do to adults when approving them for credit cards, college students
would not be able to maintain the balances which they are incapable of
paying.”281 And just as payday and installment lenders target military personnel by “situat[ing] themselves in close proximity to the front gates of
military installations,”282 card companies have historically solicited young
consumers on or near college campuses and events.283 Therefore, the
parallels that exist between lending to military personnel and young consumers may warrant capping the amount of interest charged on young
cardholders’ accounts.
In considering whether to impose a usury limitation on college-aged
consumer credit cards, lawmakers would need to consider the impact such
a restriction could have on young consumers’ access to credit cards. As
asserted in the context of low-income families, interest rate restrictions
could “make it more difficult . . . to obtain credit cards.”284 This may not
be the case for student consumers because card issuers view “‘college students as long-term investments.’”285 Therefore, issuers may be willing to
continue lending to college-aged consumers under an interest rate limit,
especially if the limit is only applicable on cardholders’ accounts who are
under the age of twenty-one. Arguably, implementing such a proposal
would succeed in providing needed protections for young consumers postissuance.
278. Graves & Peterson, supra note 276, at 677
279. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
280. The Credit CARD Act’s ability-to-pay rules and regulations are intended
to rectify this problem. See Credit CARD Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 109, 123 Stat.
1734, 1743 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1665e); Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12
C.F.R. § 226.51). However, as discussed in supra Part IV, it is doubtful that this will
be the case.
281. Representative Slaughter Statement, supra note 162, at H5020.
282. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED
AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 10 (2006); see also
Graves & Peterson, supra note 276, at 709-821 (detailing concentration of payday
lenders in military communities).
283. See MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION, supra note 10, at 167-68; Johnson,
supra note 36, at 191-93.
284. Littwin, supra note 220, at 453.
285. See Gartner & Schiltz, supra note 50, at 404 (quoting Lisa Fickenscher,
Lenders Defend Marketing Cards to Students, AM. BANKER, Apr. 18, 1994, at 17).
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Decreasing Duration of Negative Credit History Reporting

A final proposal concerns the reporting of adverse credit card history
on young consumers’ credit reports. As previously discussed, young cardholders’ financial inexperience often leads to financially detrimental behaviors such as making late payments and exceeding credit limits.286
Unbeknownst to many of them, these and other financial missteps are
chronicled in their credit reports—reports that can detrimentally affect
many of their future personal and financial opportunities.287
Currently under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), adverse items
of information288 concerning a consumer’s credit history can generally
remain a part of his or her credit report for seven years.289 In light of the
fact that young consumers’ financial mistakes are often attributable to
their lack of financial knowledge and experience,290 Congress should consider amending the FCRA to decrease the amount of time adverse credit
card information can be included in college-aged consumers’ reports.
The specific proposal is that any adverse credit card information reported
to or obtained by a credit reporting agency while the consumer is under
the age of twenty-one must be removed from the consumer’s credit report
after three years.291 By reducing the duration of time that negative credit
history can be included in young consumers’ credit reports,292 this FCRA
amendment could significantly lessen the detrimental impact that finan286. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text; Staten & Barron, supra
note 8, at 12.
287. See supra notes 135, 139 and accompanying text.
288. Although the FCRA does not define an “adverse item of information,”
the Federal Trade Commission has issued a staff opinion letter stating: “We believe
that the common understanding of these words must be used. The dictionary definition of ‘adverse’ includes ‘unfavorable’ or ‘opposed to one’s interests.’ Accordingly, we believe that to be covered by Section 605(a)(6) information must cast the
consumer in a negative or unfavorable light.” See FTC Staff Opinion Ltr. (Apr. 17,
1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcra/seham.shtm.
289. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681c(a)(2)-(5) (2006). Bankruptcies are allowed to be included in the report for ten years. See id. § 1681c(a)(1).
290. See supra notes 73, 92, 222-23 and accompanying text.
291. To conform to the language currently included in the FCRA, the proposal could read: No consumer reporting agency may make any consumer report
containing any adverse item of information that pertains to a consumer while he/
she is under the age of twenty-one which antedates the report by more than three
years. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (2006).
292. Other scholars have advocated for a reduction in reporting periods as a
means to protect consumers from various harms caused by the inclusion of adverse
information in their credit reports. See, e.g., Helping Families Save Their Homes: The
Role of Bankruptcy Law: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 14748 (2008) (statement of Adam Levitin, Prof., Geo. Univ. L. Ctr.) [hereinafter Levitin Testimony] (recommending that reporting period for bankruptcies be reduced
to same time period as those established for other items of adverse information
such as foreclosures); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of
Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1680 (2008) (suggesting
brief reporting period for information related to “someone’s involvement in landlord-tenant litigation”).
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cial mistakes can have on young cardholders’ future economic and employment opportunities. Such action would provide young cardholders
with greater and more long-term protection than that currently provided
by the Act.
Presently, if an eighteen-year-old freshman obtains a credit card then
fails to make required payments by the due date, the resulting adverse
credit history can detrimentally impact that student’s financial and personal opportunities until he or she is twenty-five years old. One could
argue that no reduction in reporting time is needed because twenty-five is
still a fairly young age at which time the negative history will be deleted
from the report. This argument, however, fails to consider the fact that
young adults experience several significant moments during this time period that can be adversely impacted by a negative credit report. Such moments include: applying for student loans for undergraduate and/or
graduate school; applying for a car loan; applying for a mortgage; applying
to rent an apartment; and applying for a job. These situations are welfareenhancing not only for the consumer but also for society as a whole.
Therefore, it is important to protect young cardholders’ future opportunities while also providing relevant and useful credit history information to
those individuals requesting reports.293 Policymakers could argue that a
three-year reporting duration accomplishes both of these goals.
Opponents of this proposal could raise the objection that someone
under the age of twenty-one who engages in behaviors that result in negative credit history could engage in similar credit-risky behaviors in the future; however, the creditor, employer, or landlord reviewing the credit
report would have no notice of this because the pre-twenty-one history has
been purged from the report. This could create a reliability issue such
that credit report evaluators would no longer trust that the report accurately reflects the credit history of the consumer. Such mistrust could lead
to adverse credit decisions for young adults.
While this is a valid concern, it can be somewhat overcome by previously discussed research that shows that many cardholders, including
young consumers, learn over time how to reduce their credit card mistakes.294 This learning results in a decrease in the frequency of behaviors
that create certain adverse credit history such as making late payments and
293. The stated purpose of the FCRA is:
The purpose of the fair credit reporting bill is to prevent consumers from
being unjustly damaged because of inaccurate or arbitrary information in
a credit report. . . . Creditors obviously have a right to know if a person
has had trouble in paying his bills. At the same time it can be unfair to
burden a consumer for life with a bad credit record if he has improved
his performance. The Associated Credit Bureaus has recognized this
problem and had proposed voluntary guidelines to its members to the
effect that adverse information not be reported if it is older than 7 years.
S. REP. NO. 91-517, at 4 (1969).
294. See supra notes 93, 223-25 and accompanying text.
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exceeding one’s credit limit.295 Although the data did indicate some
knowledge depreciation, the researchers concluded that “on net, knowledge accumulation dominates knowledge depreciation. Over time, fee
payments drastically fell.”296 Therefore, despite the duration reduction,
users of the reports could have some reassurance that they reflect a reliable credit history for consumers who may or may not have incurred negative credit card history during their college-aged years.
Opponents could also argue that because this proposal would absolve
young cardholders of their credit card transgressions after only three
years, it incentivizes bad financial behavior. This may be true in some
cases; however, it is doubtful that it would be a widespread problem due to
the negative consequences that one could still encounter during the threeyear reporting period. Such consequences include denials of credit or
employment and the imposition of unfavorable borrowing terms such as
higher default interest rates. Also, engaging in excessive bad behavior
could result in the cancellation of the card, which most consumers would
presumably want to prevent from happening.
Considering that the FCRA already includes reporting differentiations for various adverse items,297 lawmakers should not oppose including
another that affords greater protection for young consumers, especially in
light of claims that the credit card industry seeks to exploit college-aged
consumers’ lack of financial knowledge and experience.298 By imposing a
three-year reporting duration for young consumers’ adverse card information, lawmakers could strike the necessary balance between college-aged
consumers experiencing consequences for their poor financial choices
and receiving a fresh start with which to have access to beneficial economic and employment opportunities. Considering the likelihood that
the current Credit CARD Act may prove ineffective in significantly remedying the dilemma of young consumer indebtedness,299 lawmakers should
earnestly consider this and other measures that seek to lessen the longterm consequences caused by young consumers’ credit card usage.
VI. CONCLUSION
As this Article has demonstrated, the accumulation of credit card debt
continues to have significant consequences for many college-aged consumers. To provide some protection for this group of consumers, Congress
passed the Credit CARD Act. While lawmakers should be applauded for
295. See Agarwal et al., Learning, supra note 223, at 6.
296. Id. at 17.
297. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(1) (imposing ten year limitation on reporting of bankruptcies), with 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2)-(5) (imposing seven-year
limitation on reporting of other adverse items of information). But see Levitin Testimony, supra note 292 (advocating for equal treatment of bankruptcies and other
adverse information on credit reports).
298. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 193-94, 194 n.14.
299. See supra Part IV.
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taking a step in the right direction toward young consumer protection,
more should be done to provide greater protection for college-aged consumers both before they receive a credit card and after they begin using it.
Such comprehensive measures will help to more effectively preserve their
personal and financial futures.
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